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The last several decades have witnessed a dramatic change 
in how our society conceives of family, parenthood, pregnancy, 
childbirth, and gender roles. One issue at the heart of this 
change was the successful uncoupling of intercourse from 
reproduction via assisted reproductive technology (ART).1 ART 
has made it possible for a wealth of individuals, who would 
otherwise be unable, to create families and become parents.2 
Traditionally, most people think of infertile couples as the 
beneficiaries of such technology, but ART has special and 
important implications for gay and/or unmarried persons as 
well.3 Dubbed the “structurally infertile,” this latter group, if 
desirous of reproducing, “must do so through means other than 
sexual intercourse because of the social structure in which they 
self-identify.”4 
Despite the growth in popularity of ART for both the 
medically and structurally infertile, ART continues to be a 
mainly private-payer enterprise, reserved for those individuals 
who have the expendable income to pay for these expensive 
technologies.5 Given both the high demand for ART as well as 
the astronomically high cost for some ART procedures, some 
states have begun mandating insurance coverage as a means of 
ensuring that a wider range of people are able to access 
reproductive technologies.6 While much focus has been on 
whether insurance should be mandated for such procedures, 
little attention has been paid to the unusual consequences of 
mandated insurance for consumers of ART, particularly gay 
and unmarried persons. Of the fourteen states with some form 
of insurance mandate, none explicitly excludes gay or 
 1. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 
333. 
 2. Id. at 311–12. 
 3. Id. at 314–15. 
 4. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible 
Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008). 
 5. Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 
10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 49–50 (2009). 
 6. Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2095–96 (1996) [hereinafter In Vitro Fertilization]. 
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unmarried persons from coverage, but many serve to indirectly 
exclude these groups, raising distinct ethical and legal issues 
around what a state owes its citizens with respect to insurance 
coverage of ART.7 Even more legally problematic is the implicit 
exclusion of persons who are not only structurally infertile, but 
also have a medical cause for their infertility. For purposes of 
this Article, I will call this group the “medico-structurally 
infertile.” Taken both individually and as a whole, these 
regulations raise significant questions as to the purpose of state 
mandates for ART. Further questions relate to the intentions of 
such laws with respect to unmarried and gay persons and the 
political, religious, and health justice issues related to marital 
status, reproduction, sexual orientation, resource allocation, 
and health. 
This Article explores the legal and ethical tensions between 
the purpose of health insurance, the desire to improve access to 
ART for everyone, and the unique legal and ethical implications 
of state-mandated insurance for structurally infertile and 
medico-structurally infertile persons. Part II provides an 
overview of the types of technologies that qualify as ART, as 
well as statistics on the types of groups accessing or interested 
in accessing ART. In this section, the high cost of ART, methods 
of payment, and the role of cost as a barrier to access are also 
explored. State mandates for insurance coverage are set forth 
in Part III, and statutory language of individual mandates is 
used to demonstrate two types of limits on state mandates: 
external limits, such as limits on dollar amounts or numbers of 
procedures, and internal limits, which limit treatments based 
on the social status of the individual. The various implicit 
exclusions of gay and unmarried persons are also explored. 
Part IV sets forth some of the legal challenges raised by 
implicit exclusion of insurance coverage for these groups. Due 
Process, Equal Protection, and Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) challenges are each discussed. In Part V, the context of 
state-mandated insurance coverage for ART is explored in the 
broader framework of health justice, resource allocation, 
religious and political considerations with respect to sexual 
orientation, marital status, and the purposes of health 
 7. Nicole Rank, Comment, Barriers for Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies by Lesbian Women: The Search for Parity Within the Healthcare 
System, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 115, 136–41 (2009). 
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insurance. Health justice is used as the main rationale for 
arguing that gay and unmarried persons should be granted 
insurance coverage for ART under state mandates. Lastly, in 
Part VI, the advantages and disadvantages of state-mandated 
insurance versus an alternative mechanism of tax deductions 
are explored with particular attention paid to the implications 
of these mechanisms for gay and unmarried persons. 
Concluding that state mandates are currently the best solution 
for ensuring wider access to ART for everyone, the Article 
encourages legislatures to consider a number of important 
ethical, legal, and social factors in drafting state mandates for 
insurance coverage of ART and in ensuring fair access for gay 
and unmarried persons. 
II. BACKGROUND: USAGE, ACCESS, AND COST IN 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
A. DEFINITIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
defines ART, widely known as ART, as “all fertility treatments 
in which both eggs and sperm are handled.”8 In this way, ART 
is “designed to enable conception . . . when coital reproduction 
is either not possible or not desirable.”9 ART encompasses a 
number of specific techniques and procedures including: 
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), which is the placing of 
eggs and sperm into the fallopian tubes; zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (ZIFT), which is the placing of a zygote in the fallopian 
tubes; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which is 
“the direct insertion of an individual sperm into the ovum,” a 
technique often used to remedy male-factor infertilities.10 In-
vitro fertilization (IVF) is the most complex, invasive, and 
expensive of all the ARTs.11 IVF begins with hormone therapy 
given to the woman to induce ovulation, followed by egg 
 8. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art (last updated Oct. 21, 2010). 
 9. Justyn Lezin, (Mis)conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally 
Unmarried Women’s Access to Reproductive Technology and their Use of 
Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 190 (2003). 
 10. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 45–46. 
 11. See Daar, supra note 4, at 20 n.3 (describing the procedural steps 
necessary for IVF); Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing 
Coverage Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 300 (2005) 
(suggesting that IVF is more complex than another form of artificial 
insemination); Schultz, supra note 1, at 339 n.125. 
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retrieval and fertilization of the eggs with semen, incubation of 
the fertilized egg(s) in a laboratory dish for several days until 
an embryo is formed, and, lastly, the transplant of the embryo 
directly into the uterus.12 All of the above technologies may or 
may not involve the use of gamete donors (third parties that 
donate eggs and sperm),13 cryopreservation and storage of 
gametes,14 and/or gestational surrogates (third parties that 
gestate and birth the fetus), all of which are factors particularly 
relevant for gay and unmarried persons considering ART.15 
Though not considered an ART, artificial insemination, where 
sperm is transferred into a female’s reproductive tract to 
produce pregnancy,16 implicates ethical and legal challenges 
similar to that of ART,17 and is also a popular method of 
pregnancy for lesbians and single women because it enables 
pregnancy without sexual intercourse with a male.18 
Different medical and structural needs, as well as gender 
issues, determine the type of ART one uses to become pregnant. 
Lesbian couples and single women may often achieve 
pregnancy through the simpler method of artificial 
insemination, if there are no medically-related problems.19 
Using a known or anonymous sperm donor, the single woman 
or lesbian woman can become pregnant with the use of her own 
eggs and can gestate the pregnancy, barring any medical 
barriers.20 Gay or single men who wish to reproduce require 
the use of a gestational surrogate, who is impregnated by any 
of the techniques above using the sperm of the single man, one 
of the couple members, or a donor. 21 For structurally infertile 
 12. Pendo, supra note 11, at 300. 
 13. Shultz, supra note 1, at 312. 
 14. Daar, supra note 4, at 20 n.4. 
 15. Id. at 33. 
 16. James Ringo ed., Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: 
Health Care Law Chapter: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 10 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 859, 860–61 (2009). 
 17. Rank, supra note 7, at 127. 
 18. See id. at 130 (suggesting that many women find greater success with 
physician-assisted insemination than with self-insemination). 
 19. See Bebe J. Anderson, Lesbians, Gays, and People Living with HIV: 
Facing and Fighting Barriers to Assisted Reproduction, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 451, 453–454 (2009) (suggesting that artificial insemination is 
particularly relevant to lesbians, and that it can be ceased if the donor is found 
to be HIV positive). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 453. 
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individuals or couples who also have medical infertility, the 
type of ART used depends on both the structural infertility as 
well as the type of medical infertility.22 In these instances, the 
more expensive IVF and gestational surrogacy may be 
necessary. For example, a single woman with blocked fallopian 
tubes would require sperm donation because of her structural 
infertility, but would also require in-vitro fertilization because 
of her medical infertility.23 
B. POPULARITY OF ART 
The business of treating infertility is booming, with more 
than one million individuals seeking infertility treatment on an 
annual basis.24 ART usage has rapidly increased over the last 
decade, with the number of ART cycles and babies born from 
ART doubling between 1996 and 2005.25 More than 54,000 
babies were born in the United States with the help of assisted 
reproduction in 2006 alone, which accounts for more than one 
percent of U.S. births that year.26 Scholars estimate that the 
business of assisted reproduction in the United States is “at 
least a $1.7 billion market before even considering sperm sales, 
high-end eggs, legal fees, surrogacy, or adoption.”27 
The ten percent of the population that suffers from 
medically-related infertility accounts for a significant portion of 
ART use.28 Medical infertility affects both genders and occurs 
across all races, ethnic backgrounds, and socioeconomic 
levels.29 “The incidence of structural infertility. . . [however] is 
largely unknown, as no government surveys report such 
figures.”30 Data suggests, however, that structurally infertile 
persons are also finding ways, whether by ART or otherwise, to 
 22. Id. at 454–55 (explaining differences in ART methods when a donor or 
surrogate is infected with HIV). 
 23. Rank, supra note 7, at 119. 
 24. Pendo, supra note 11, at 298. 
 25. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 46. 
 26. Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://cdc.gov/Reproductivehealth/DRH/activities/ART.htm (last updated July 
31, 2009). 
 27. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5 at 47. 
 28. See Daar, supra note 4, at 24, 34 (stating that 1.2 million medically 
infertile women sought ART in 2005, and that the majority of ART patients 
are heterosexual, married women). 
 29. Pendo, supra note 11, at 298. 
 30. Daar, supra note 4, at 25. 
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have families.31 
The rates of reproduction outside of heterosexual married 
relationships have been increasing in recent years. 
Approximately forty percent of births in the Unites States are 
now to single, unmarried women.32 Additionally, the 1980s saw 
an increase in children born to lesbian women. The same 
increase occurred with gay men in the 1990s, causing the 
media to coin the term the “gay baby boom.”33 “Currently in the 
United States, there are an estimated six to fourteen million 
children being raised by at least one gay or lesbian parent, 
usually as a result of a heterosexual relationship.”34 “[T]he 
2000 Census Report documented a total of 594,000 households 
headed by same-sex couples; thirty-three percent of female 
same-sex households and twenty-two percent of male couples 
had children.” 35 However, it is difficult to estimate the extent 
to which this trend in families raised by single or gay persons is 
due to ART versus other factors.36 Newspaper accounts 
“suggest that one-third of all [artificial insemination] 
consumers in the U.S. are unmarried women,” indicating that 
there is a strong current of structurally infertile groups making 
use of ART.37 
The burgeoning market of ART is appealing to both 
medically infertile and structurally infertile groups as a means 
of creating genetic offspring. The next section will discuss some 
of the financial and access issues raised by ART for these 
groups. 
 31. Id. at 28. 
 32. The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to 
Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 1190, 1190 (2009) [hereinafter ASRM]. 
 33. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian 
Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 147–48 (2000). 
 34. ASRM, supra note 32, at 1191. 
 35. Daar, supra note 4, at 32–33. 
 36. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 147 (suggesting that most children being 
raised by gay men and lesbian women result from previously heterosexual 
relationships, but that the number of children born to gay and lesbian couples 
utilizing ART is rising). 
 37. Daar, supra note 4, at 25. 
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C. PURSE STRINGS AND PARENTHOOD: COST AS A BARRIER TO 
ART 
ART is a costly endeavor in the United States. Staniec and 
Webb aptly describe the situation when they say that, for many 
infertile couples, the question is not whether or not to have 
children, but rather “[h]ow will we get pregnant?” followed 
closely by “[h]ow will we afford it?”38 The average cost of one 
cycle of IVF is “more than $10,000 and it frequently takes 
multiple cycles to achieve pregnancy, with success rates 
decreasing with each try.”39 Cost for a successful delivery as a 
result of IVF is estimated at $66,667 if successful by the first 
cycle and as high as $114,286 if it takes six cycles.40 These 
costs vary by a number of patient factors, but can be even 
higher when egg donation or gestational surrogacy is 
involved.41 Other forms of ART, such as artificial insemination, 
are more affordable but still cost over $1,000 and do not work 
for everyone.42 
It is important to reiterate that, in the context of structural 
infertility, high-tech and expensive interventions may not 
always be necessary, but sometimes are. Single women and 
lesbians without medical infertility may become successfully 
pregnant with sperm donation, which is fairly inexpensive or 
may even be gifted.43 Artificial insemination can be done at 
home at no cost or at a physician’s office.44 Multiple attempts 
 38. See J. Farley Ordovensky Staniec & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of 
Infertility Services: How Much Does Money Matter, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 971, 
971–72 (2007). 
 39. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 49. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Donor eggs typically cost between $3,000 and $5,000 with an average 
IVF cycle then costing between $15,000 and $25,000. “Some small portion of 
these eggs—known colloquially as ‘Ivy League’ or ‘designer’ eggs—fetched in 
the range of $25,000 to $ 50,000.” Id. at 47. Gestational surrogacy is also an 
expensive endeavor. “Currently, the typical fee for a first time surrogate 
mother ranges from $14,000 to $18,000, with an average of $15,000.” Jennifer 
Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should 
Surrogate Mothers be Compensated for their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & 
FAM. ADVOC. 529, 531 (2007). This payment may be significantly higher where 
the surrogate agrees to additional medical tests or to carry or implant multiple 
fetuses. See id. at 531–32. 
 42. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in 
Forbidden Exchange: The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 147, 149 (2009). 
 43. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 160. 
 44. See id. 
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however, may cost thousands of dollars.45 Furthermore, gay or 
single men must rely on gestational surrogacy and may require 
egg donation, both of which are very expensive practices.46 
Certainly, too, any such individuals who experience some 
medical infertility may also require IVF or other more invasive 
and costly forms of ART. 
In addition, while some people advocate adoption as an 
alternative to ART for the medically and/or structurally 
infertile, adoption can also be an expensive endeavor and does 
not satisfy the goals of creating a genetically-related child, 
which is important to some individuals or couples.47 
Furthermore, some laws prohibit certain structurally infertile 
persons, including gay and unmarried persons, from adopting 
children.48 
Not surprisingly, researchers have found that “financial 
access . . . [has] significant effects on the probability of seeking 
infertility treatments.”49 Income and insurance coverage of 
infertility services are two of the major predictors for seeking 
infertility treatment, and few individuals have fertility 
treatments like ART covered under their healthcare plans.50 
International surveys of foreign countries also indicate that 
cost plays a large role in access to ART. “Nations with national 
health care systems report higher rates of infertility help-
seeking.”51 In the United States, where the cost of treatment is 
 45. Id. 
 46. “After medical and legal bills are calculated, the entire final cost of a 
surrogacy arrangement may be $20,000–$30,000 or more.” Id. at 161. 
 47. “Adoption costs vary greatly depending on the type of adoption and 
the characteristics of the child.” While foster-care adoptions can be relatively 
inexpensive, some adoptions can cost as much as $30,000 or more. 
Additionally, foreign adoptions can also be time-consuming and expensive. See 
Jacoby, supra note 42, at 150. 
 48. For example, in Utah, “[i]n order to adopt, you must be an adult who 
is either married (and has permission from your spouse) or single (and not 
cohabiting with another person).” This requirement rules out individuals who 
are gay and individuals who are unmarried but cohabitating with a partner. 
Domestic Law Handbook, UTAH LEGAL SERVS., 
http://www.utahlegalservices.org/public/self-help-webpages/domestic-law-
handbook#Adoption (last modified Aug. 10, 2009). 
 49. Staniec & Webb, supra note 38, at 985. 
 50. Lynn K. White et al., Explaining Disparities in Treatment Seeking: 
The Case of Infertility, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 853, 855 (2006). The role 
that insurance coverage plays in increasing access to ART will be discussed in 
more depth later in this paper. 
 51. Id. 
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paid out-of-pocket, only one-half of all infertile women seek 
treatment.52 In contrast, other developed nations which cover 
infertility treatment have much higher rates of access.53 
The high cost of ART and its impact on access have led 
many to challenge the system as “inherently inequit[able].”54 
One scholar claims that “only a fortunate few can afford to 
spend $50,000, much less $100,000, in order to have a chance 
at a baby . . . [m]any couples are forced out of the baby business 
from the outset.”55 Another critiques the field of assisted 
reproduction as “relying on the emotional desperation of 
childless couples to inflate the asking price” and argues that 
ART “provide[s] choice for affluent middle-class couples . . . 
however, the same privilege is denied to the less affluent.”56 
Furthermore, worrisome practices exist among the eighty-
five percent of infertile individuals who do choose to pay for 
these technologies out-of-pocket. “They will mortgage their 
houses, sell their cars, deplete the family savings” or sign up 
“for a host of credit cards and charg[e] up to their credit 
limit.”57 Banks are now even offering fertility market loans to 
eligible consumers.58 
D. PROPOSED ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO ACCESS ISSUES IN ART 
Mandated insurance coverage has been proposed as a 
means of reducing inequity in assisted reproduction and 
equalizing access across socioeconomic groups. The high 
demand for and costs of ART and the frequent need for 
multiple interventions all serve as disincentives for insurers to 
cover such procedures under health plans. “Only one in four 
employers cover some form of fertility services, and ARTs, the 
most expensive fertility treatments, are unlikely to be 
 52. A. L. Greil & J. McQuillan, Help-Seeking Patterns among Subfecund 
Women, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 305, 312 tbl.2 (2004). 
 53. See Daar, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that infertile women seek 
treatment 67% of the time in Finland, 86% of the time in the Netherlands, and 
72–95% of the time in the United Kingdom.). 
 54. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 50. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
517, 530–31 (1997). 
 57. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 150; see also Anna L. Benjamin, The 
Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. 213 to Subsidize 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2004). 
 58. See Jacoby, supra note 42, at 161. 
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included.”59 Lobbyists in favor of mandated insurance have 
encouraged reform at both the state and federal level. While 
federal reform has not yet been successful, efforts in the House 
of Representatives to mandate coverage for infertility still 
persist with the Family Building Act of 2009. The Act, which 
was introduced by Representative Anthony Weiner (D-NY), has 
been referred to the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee.60 Additionally, since the 1980s, fourteen states 
have successfully mandated some type of insurance coverage 
for fertility treatment.61 
Among these fourteen states, most do not require broad 
insurance coverage of ART. Many exclude certain types of 
infertility or certain treatments (especially IVF, the most 
expensive treatment).62 Additionally, many of these state 
mandates do not encompass employer-funded health benefit 
plans because of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act.63 In states that mandate some form of coverage, “rates of 
access to assisted reproduction have been significantly 
higher.”64 However, many people in these states are still left 
without coverage because they either do not have insurance or 
are covered by self-insured employers that fall outside of these 
mandates.65 Additionally, many of these statutes implicitly bar 
unmarried or same sex couples from coverage, regardless of 
whether they have a medical infertility that might otherwise 
qualify under the statute. Lastly, because persons in same sex 
relationships are unable to legally marry in most states, they 
often cannot be covered under their partners’ insurance.66 
 59. Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1121. 
 60. Family Building Act of 2009, H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (2009), available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-697. The act would 
have required any insurer covering impotence to also cover fertility treatment, 
but it failed to survive House subcommittees on health and labor-management 
relations and was stalled a month after it had been introduced in Congress. 
 61. Benjamin, supra note 57 at 1121–22; Aaron C. McKee, The American 
Dream - 2.5 Kids and a White Picket Fence: The Need for Federal Legislation to 
Protect the Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 191, 205 
(2001). 
 62. See Maren Minnaert & Melissa Tai, Fourth Annual Review of Gender 
and Sexuality Law: Family Law Chapter: Assisted Reproductive Technology, 4 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 299, 323–24 (2002). 
 63. Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1121–22. 
 64. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Rank, supra note 7, at 130. 
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III. REGULATION OF ART AND MANDATED INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 
To understand how medical and structural fertility are 
treated under the regulatory framework of ART, one must first 
understand the status of ART regulation more generally. 
Currently, federal laws provide little guidance on the practice 
or provision of ART to the public, including whether or not 
insurance providers are required to cover ART. The duty of 
regulating who can access ART and whether it should be paid 
for by insurance companies has mainly fallen to the individual 
states and, in some instances, the infertility treatment centers 
and providers. 
In the fourteen states that have enacted laws requiring 
insurers to cover diagnosis and/or treatment of infertility, there 
are varying levels of coverage depending on a number of 
factors. Factors such as the types of treatments covered by a 
mandate and how much of the treatment must be covered are, 
for our purposes, referred to as “external factors.” These 
external factors place limits on access to ART, regardless of 
who is seeking treatment. Factors determining who is 
permitted to seek treatment under a given mandate are referred 
to as “internal factors” because they base coverage decisions on 
the individual’s personal characteristics, such as marriage 
status, sexual orientation, or medical disability. 
External factors include a number of limits on the scope of 
coverage provided under the mandates. For example, some 
mandates require that coverage be provided for fertility 
treatments, as seen in Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.67 Other states, such as 
 67. Arkansas’ statute provides coverage only for IVF and does not 
mention other fertility treatments.  ARK. CODE ANN. §23-86-118 (2004) 
 (stating all health insurance companies “shall include, as a covered expense, 
in vitro fertilization”). Connecticut’s statute requires that health insurance 
policy “shall provide coverage for the medically necessary expenses of . . . 
infertility.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007). Hawaii mandates 
pregnancy-related benefits “shall include in addition to any other benefits for 
treating infertility, a one-time only benefit for all outpatient expenses arising 
from in vitro fertilization.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005). Illinois’ 
statute mandates that “[n]o group policy. . . may be issued . . . unless the 
policy contains coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” 215 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008). Maryland’s statute mandates 
that “[a]n entity . . . that provides pregnancy-related benefits may not exclude 
benefits for all outpatient expenses arising from in-vitro fertilization.” MD. 
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California and Texas, only require that infertility treatment be 
offered.68 Some states place limits that depend on the specific 
treatment in question. For instance, California and New York 
have expressly excluded IVF from the fertility treatments 
covered,69 while Arkansas specifically includes IVF but does 
not identify other fertility treatments.70 A number of the states 
limit coverage by placing a maximum dollar amount or by 
limiting the number of procedures that are covered.71 
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). Massachusetts requires any 
blanket or general policy of insurance “shall provide, to the same extent that 
benefits are provided for other pregnancy-related procedures, coverage for 
medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008). Montana requires health 
maintenance organizations to cover “basic health services” which are defined 
to include “infertility services.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (2009). New 
Jersey mandates that group health insurance policy “shall provide coverage 
which includes, but is not limited to, the following services related to 
infertility.” N.J. STAT. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). New York’s statute states that” 
[e]very policy which provides coverage for hospital care shall not exclude 
coverage . . . solely because the medical condition results in infertility.” N.Y. 
INSURANCE LAW § 3216 (2010). Ohio requires health maintenance 
organizations to cover “basic health services,” which include “infertility 
services.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2009). Rhode 
Island requires any health insurance contract “shall provide coverage for 
medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008). West Virginia requires health maintenance 
organizations to cover “basic health care services,” which includes “infertility 
services.” W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2006). See generally State 
Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/InsuranceCoverageforInfertility
Laws/tabid/14391/Default.aspx (last updated September 2010) [hereinafter 
NCSL]. 
 68. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008) (requiring that 
“every health care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for the treatment of 
infertility, except in vitro fertilization”); TEX. INS. CODE 1366.003 (West 2009) 
(stating that “an issuer of a group health benefit plan that provides 
pregnancy-related benefits . . . shall offer and make available . . . coverage for . 
. . expenses incurred . . . from in vitro fertilization procedures.”); see generally 
NCSL, supra note 67. 
 69. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008) (“[e]very health 
care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for the treatment of infertility, except 
in vitro fertilization.”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (3)(E)(i) (2010) (stating that 
“[c]overage shall not be required to include . . . in vitro fertilization”). 
 70. The Arkansas statute provides that health plans “shall include, as a 
covered expense, in vitro fertilization.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-118 (2004). 
 71. For example, Hawaii provides only a “one-time benefit for all 
outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 
431:10A-116.5 (2005). Maryland places a limit at “three in vitro fertilization 
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Additionally, some states only offer more expensive procedures 
such as IVF as a last resort and require that the patient 
undergo less expensive procedures first.72 Some statutes also 
place limits on the types of plans that must cover certain 
infertility treatments. For example, Ohio’s mandate only 
applies to health maintenance organizations (HMOs),73 and 
other states allow religious institutions to opt out of coverage 
that is “inconsistent with the religious organization’s religious 
and ethical principles.”74 
For the most part, state insurance mandates based on 
external factors apply equally to all individuals. While such 
external factors are important with respect to individuals’ 
access to ART, it is those laws that use internal factors to 
determine insurance coverage that are most significant with 
respect to the rights of gay and/or unmarried persons. These 
states’ insurance mandates contain one or more of the following 
preconditions: (1) requirements that a person engage in 
unprotected sexual intercourse for a particular number of years 
without pregnancy, (2) requirements that the experience of 
infertility last a particular number of years, (3) use of spousal 
language, (4) requirements that the cause of infertility be 
either medically caused or unexplained, and (5) requirements 
that the infertility treatment be medically necessary. Tables 1a 
and 1b describe which states require which preconditions. 
These preconditions often translate into unequal access to 
mandated insurance coverage on the basis of marriage status, 
sexual orientation, and/or medical disability. Resulting legal 
attempts per live birth, not to exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,000.” 
MD. CODE ANN., INS § 15-810(5)(d) (LexisNexis 2006). Illinois limits oocyte 
retrieval to four, or two extra if a live birth follows oocyte retrieval. 215 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008)  New Jersey limits to four oocyte 
retrievals in a lifetime. N.J. STAT. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). Connecticut makes 
separate lifetime limits on cycles for each type of fertility treatment covered. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007). 
 72. New Jersey limits availability to those who have “used all reasonable, 
less expensive, and medically appropriate treatments.” N.J. Stat. § 17:48-6x 
(West 2008). Illinois statute states that coverage for IVF, GIFT and ZIFT is 
only available where “the covered individual has been unable to attain or 
sustain a successful pregnancy though reasonable, less costly . . . treatments.” 
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008). 
 73. Ohio law requires health maintenance organizations to cover “basic 
health services” which include “infertility services.,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 74. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007). Among states 
providing religious exemption are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and Texas. 
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challenges  will be discussed in turn. 
 
Table 1a: Summary of State’s Statutory Language in 
Mandates for Insurance Coverage of ART 
 (X) number of years of 
sexual relations without 
contraception 
(X) number of years of 
infertility 
Arkansas   
California X  
Connecticut  X 
Hawaii   
Illinois X  
Maryland   
Massachusetts  X 
New Jersey X  
New York   
Ohio   
Rhode Island  X 
Texas   
West Virginia   
 
 
Table 1b: Summary of State’s Statutory Language in 









Arkansas    
California    
Connecticut   X 
Hawaii X X  
Illinois    
Maryland X X  
Massachusetts   X 
New Jersey    
New York    
Ohio   X 
Rhode Island X  X 
Texas X X  
West Virginia    
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A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF STATE MANDATES 
1. Statutes That Require Sexual Relations Without 
Contraception 
Three states, California,75 Illinois,76 and New Jersey,77 
have statutory language requiring that individuals engage in a 
certain period of unprotected sex without successful pregnancy 
in order to qualify for mandated insurance coverage. The 
implications of this requirement are unclear for both 
structurally and medico-structurally infertile persons. “While 
the drafters of the legislation may not have intended to extend 
coverage to [gay persons,] . . . it is conceivable that the 
language and definition may be construed to include such 
couples . . . through the acknowledgment that ‘regular sexual 
relations’ could include sexual interactions between two people 
of the same sex.”78 However, the issue of what types of 
intercourse would be included is a matter for the legislature 
and the courts. 
Among these three states, New Jersey’s language is the 
most exclusionary. The statute requires that the inability to 
conceive after the period of unprotected intercourse be caused 
by a “disease or condition that results in the abnormal function 
of the reproductive system.”79 Gays, lesbians, and unmarried 
persons with structural infertility are not likely to be viewed as 
having abnormal functioning of their reproductive systems 
given the very definition of structural infertility. Medico-
structurally infertile persons, however, would fall under this 
definition if they have proof of their medical condition. 
In contrast, California’s statutory language does not 
 75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ 
means either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a 
licensed physician . . . as a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a 
pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of 
regular sexual relations without contraception.” (emphasis added)). 
 76. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m(2)(c) (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ 
means the inability to conceive after one year of unprotected sexual 
intercourse or the inability to sustain a successful pregnancy.”). 
 77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ means the 
disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive 
system such that a person is not able to: impregnate another person; conceive 
after two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35 
years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 
years of age or older.”). 
 78. Rank, supra note 7, at 139. 
 79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). 
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require disease and only requires a period of unprotected 
intercourse.80 Consequently, California’s statute does not 
necessarily eliminate gay or unmarried persons. On the 
contrary, this requirement could exclude persons who are 
heterosexual and married if they failed to engage in 
unprotected sex. However, the applicability of the statute to 
gay and unmarried persons may differ from its applicability to 
heterosexual married for a number of reasons. First, same sex 
couples may not attempt unprotected sex because their 
intercourse is not intended for procreative purposes, and 
unmarried persons may not engage in sexual intercourse, 
protected or unprotected, because they do not have a partner 
with whom they wish to procreate. Thus, while either a same 
sex couple or unmarried person may wish to reproduce, 
unprotected intercourse may not be an avenue that is possible 
or desirable.81 Second, it is unclear the extent to which the 
statute requires monogamous sexual intercourse. As an 
example, a single person could engage in heterosexual 
unprotected sexual activity with a variety of partners over a 
period of years without becoming pregnant, but this could be 
due to infertility of the partners or infrequency of intercourse, 
as opposed to the infertility of the individual. Furthermore, the 
same requirements apply to medico-structurally infertile 
persons. Regardless of whether they are gay or unmarried, 
medico-structurally infertile individuals only qualify for 
mandated insurance coverage if they engage in intercourse and 
the intercourse is unprotected.82 This requirement has 
interesting implications for both structurally and medico-
structurally infertile persons, given that protection may be 
used during sex for both pregnancy prevention and prevention 
of sexually transmitted infections (STIs)—an issue which will 
be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 
 80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (West 2008). 
 81. Importantly, a requirement that a couple engage in unprotected sex is 
also unusual in circumstances where individuals have known infertility, such 
as an instance where a woman has a cancer-related hysterectomy. While the 
unprotected sex requirement is likely in place to ensure that individuals who 
can achieve natural pregnancy do so, it serves as a unique burden for those 
who already know that intercourse will not achieve their reproductive goals. 
 82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). 
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2. Statutes That Require Number Of Years Of Infertility 
Perhaps the most inclusive statutory language defines 
infertility as the “condition of a presumably healthy individual 
who is unable to conceive or produce conception or sustain a 
successful pregnancy during a one-year period.”83 
Connecticut,84 Massachusetts,85 and Rhode Island86 all use this 
language in their statutes, and New Jersey, while also 
requiring unprotected intercourse, also uses the “condition” 
language.87 While Rhode Island’s language also requires that 
the presumably healthy individual be married,88 thus 
eliminating all forms of structurally infertile persons, the 
statutes of Connecticut and Massachusetts offer the broadest 
language and greatest chance for inclusion of structurally 
infertile persons. In these two states, the statutory language 
does not require any type of medical cause for the infertility, 
nor does it require that there be unprotected intercourse or an 
abnormal functioning of the reproductive system. Given the 
breadth of these statutes, structurally infertile persons and 
medico-structurally infertile persons who have not reproduced 
in a certain period of time may qualify in the same manner as 
heterosexual individuals, depending on the interpretation of 
the term “condition.” If, as one scholar argues, homosexuality 
could easily be included as a condition that would prevent a 
healthy individual from reproducing,89 then structurally 
infertile persons would be covered under these types of 
mandates. However, a court could interpret the term 
“condition” as meaning a medical condition that prevented 
pregnancy. Furthermore, it is unclear what the statues mean 
by the term “condition” and whether there are certain efforts 
which must be made during that year period to prove 
infertility, or, alternatively, whether one must simply live for a 
year without producing pregnancy. This language is, however, 
 83. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 38a-536 (West 2007). 
 84. Id. 
 85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008) 
(“‘[I]nfertility’ shall mean the condition of a presumably healthy individual 
who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a period of one year.”). 
 86. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ means the condition of 
an otherwise presumably healthy married individual who is unable to conceive 
or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year.”). 
 87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). 
 88. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008). 
 89. Rank, supra note 7, at 139–40. 
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the broadest statutory language and offers the greatest hope 
for inclusion of the structurally and medico-structurally 
infertile. 
The language in these statutes also presents another 
interesting question about the definition of infertility: Can an 
individual who has never engaged in intercourse (or not 
recently engaged in intercourse) claim to be infertile because he 
or she has not procreated? Because this statutory language 
does not explicitly require intercourse, but does require 
infertility, this issue is unclear. 
3. Statutes That Use Spouse Language 
Regulations in Hawaii,90 Maryland,91 and Texas92 all 
require that a patient’s eggs be fertilized with her spouse’s 
sperm and, thus, strictly eliminate the possibility that single or 
gay persons can be covered under the mandates.93 Similarly, 
Rhode Island, as discussed above, requires marriage for 
coverage under its mandate.94 Strictly limiting coverage to 
those who engage in heterosexual, married relationships, 
“[t]here is no question . . . that the [Texas] statute does not 
require coverage of assisted reproductive technologies for single 
parents or unmarried couples (which encompasses lesbians, 
[where] homosexual marriage is not recognized . . . ).”95 
Furthermore, gay couples would not qualify because they 
cannot provide both an egg and sperm, as the statutory 
wording requires. Unmarried heterosexual persons are also 
excluded based on the marriage requirement. In addition, 
medico-structurally infertile persons are excluded because of 
the spouse language and the requirement of heterosexual 
gametes. It is important to note that, regardless of statutory 
 90. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005). 
 91. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 92. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. Art. 1366.005 (West 2009). 
 93. Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas all have language in their statutes 
which states that insurance need only cover forms of ART where the patient’s 
eggs are fertilized with spouse’s sperm. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 
(2005); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). Similarly, the Rhode 
Island statute defines fertility as “the condition of an otherwise healthy 
married individual who is unable to conceive.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 
(2008) (emphasis added). This marriage requirement again naturally 
eliminates same sex couples and the unmarried. 
 94. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008). 
 95. Rank, supra note 7, at 137–38. 
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intent, this statutory language removes the possibility of 
gamete donation more generally, thus excluding even 
heterosexual, married persons who are infertile because of egg 
or sperm-based infertility. 
4. Statutes That Require Medical or Unexplained Cause of 
Infertility 
For the state mandate to apply, some states require that 
the period of infertility either be unexplained or linked to 
certain specific medical conditions that cause infertility. As 
Table 1b above shows, statutes in Hawaii, Maryland, and 
Texas all contain such language. Interestingly, states with this 
requirement are the same states that require a spouse’s sperm 
to fertilize an egg, as discussed in the previous section.96 The 
requirement that the cause of infertility be medical or 
unexplained automatically eliminates non-medically infertile 
gay persons, whose infertility is both explained and not caused 
by a medical condition. For unmarried persons without medical 
infertility, it is harder to determine whether they would qualify 
for unexplained infertility. If they were abstinent, rarely 
engaged in intercourse, or engaged in intercourse with multiple 
partners, it would arguably be difficult to say that infertility is 
unexplained. Those individuals who engage in monogamous, 
heterosexual sex, however, would still not qualify in these 
states because they are excluded based on the spousal 
requirement discussed previously. Furthermore, while medico-
structurally infertile persons would qualify under this language 
because they have a medical reason for their infertility, they 
too would be disqualified in these states because of the spousal 
and heterosexual gamete requirements.97 
5. Statutes Which Require that Treatment Be Medically 
Necessary 
Other states, like Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and 
Rhode Island indicate that the procedure must be “medically 
 96. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 
15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 97. The statute in New Jersey is equally problematic. It requires that the 
infertility be caused by a disease or condition, without defining what a 
condition is. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). Does a condition mean a 
medical condition or an aspect of one’s life (such as having intercourse with a 
member of the same sex) which would result in the inability to have children? 
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necessary.”98 Again, statutory interpretation will dictate 
whether structurally infertile persons are covered under this 
type of statute. If “medically necessary” means that there has 
to be a medical cause that requires the treatment, then only 
medico-structurally infertile persons would be covered under 
the statute. Some argue that fertility treatment is not viewed 
as medically necessary for same sex couples because “[b]y 
definition, gays and lesbians are not medically infertile, rather, 
they are constructively infertile because they do not have 
sexual intercourse with members of the opposite sex.”99 If 
interpreted more broadly to include instances where technology 
is medically necessary to procreate, however, these types of 
statutes would also include those with structural infertility, 
regardless of whether because they are single or gay, and ART 
would be equally medically necessary for both medically 
infertile and constructively infertile persons. Medico-
structurally infertile persons, however, definitely qualify under 
the medical necessity requirement, provided they can show 
medical cause. 
The implications of this statutory phrasing have received 
some attention in the literature. One scholar has argued that 
fertility treatment of gay persons is not medically necessary 
because (a) adoption and intercourse with the opposite sex are 
potential alternatives, (b) medical insurance should only cover 
what is medically legitimate and not what is the foreseeable 
result of one’s social choice, (c) medical insurance is intended to 
treat dysfunction, which is not present in the socially infertile, 
and (d) medical treatments are for medical conditions.100 In 
opposition, another scholar argues that (a) many medical 
treatments are available which are not the exclusive cure for a 
problem, (b) being gay is not a choice, and, even if it were, 
people receive medical care even where the harm caused was a 
result of their choice, (c) dysfunction is a fluid concept, and 
plenty of legitimate medical treatments address issues other 
 98. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01(A)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008). 
 99. DeLair, supra note 33, at 175. 
 100. Rank, supra note 7, at 131–34 (citing Maurice Rickard, PARLIAMENT 
OF AUSTRALIA, IS IT MEDICALLY LEGITIMATE TO PROVIDE ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENTS TO FERTILE LESBIANS AND SINGLE WOMEN? 8 
(2000), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2000-
01/01RP23.pdf). 
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than outright dysfunction, and d) medicine is intended to treat 
not just conditions, but also symptoms, and, furthermore, 
medical treatment is deemed appropriate even in the ten 
percent of infertility cases that are unexplained.101 The issue of 
whether gay, unmarried, and medico-structurally infertile 
persons’ use of ART is medically necessary deserves further 
attention in the future. 
Other states like West Virginia have statutes that are very 
broad and harder to define. Here, the law requires that HMOs 
cover “basic health care services,” which includes “infertility 
services.” This breadth of coverage seems to include both the 
structurally and medico-structurally infertile. Where a statute 
provides little guidance as to which fertility treatments are 
covered and for whom, provisions are generally interpreted in 
favor of the insured. Courts look to the average person in 
determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, leaving 
it unclear whether gay, unmarried, or medico-structurally 
infertile persons could successfully argue coverage under these 
mandates.102 
Table 2 summarizes the results of this section as to which 
states are most and least likely to exclude structurally and 
medico-structurally infertile persons from coverage under the 
mandate, based on the five different statutory requirements. As 
the table shows, all of the states implicitly exclude gay and 
unmarried persons from coverage or have laws that could 
potentially be interpreted in a way that excludes at least some 
unmarried or gay persons, with the exception of West Virginia, 
which adopted broad statutory language. States like Hawaii, 
Maryland, Rhode Island, and Texas use spousal language and 
eliminate gamete donation, thereby more directly eliminating 
coverage for gay and unmarried persons. Other states’ 
exclusions are more subtle and less clear, like California’s. 
Table 2 suggests that, in most statutory frameworks, medico-
structurally infertile persons are also excluded from coverage 
for the same reasons, apart from those states like Ohio where 





 101. Rank, supra note 7, at 133–34 (citing Rickard, supra note 100). 
 102. Minnaert & Tai, supra note 62, at 325–27. 
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STATE MANDATES 
A brief discussion of the legislative history of these statutes 
provides some guidance with respect to states’ intent in 
mandating insurance coverage of ART, including whether there 
was overt discriminatory exclusion of the structurally infertile. 
Session laws and press releases of four states, California, 
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Jersey will be explored. 
California’s session laws related to its state mandate make 
four points: (1) that “[i]nfertility is a significant health problem 
that affects millions of Californians,” (2) “[i]nfertility is a 
medical illness . . . similar to other illnesses or conditions that 
is created by the malfunction of other bodily organs . . . and 
should be treated for purposes of insurance the same as any 
other body disfunction,” (3) “[i]f properly treated, successful 
pregnancies can result in 70 percent  of the cases,” and (4) 
“[i]nsurance coverage for infertility is uneven, inconsistent, and 
frequently subject to arbitrary decisions which are not based on 
legitimate medical considerations.” 103 
Maryland’s session laws address the obligations of health 
maintenance organizations (HMO’s) as insurers.104 The state 
                                                          
 103. 1989 Cal. Stat. 2428. 
 104. 2000 Md. Laws 1657. 
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requires that “[a]n entity . . . provid[ing] pregnancy-related 
benefits may not exclude benefits for all outpatient expenses 
arising from in vitro fertilization procedures . . . . The     
benefits . . . shall be provided [by] health maintenance 
organization, to the same extent as the benefits provided for 
other infertility services.”105 
The session laws of Massachusetts regarding mandated 
insurance coverage for assisted reproduction, entitled An Act to 
Promote Cost Containment, Transparency, and Efficiency in 
the Provision of Quality Health Insurance for Individuals and 
Small Businesses, call for “containment, transparency and 
efficiency in the provision of quality health insurance . . . .”106 
Lastly, New Jersey has a relevant press release related to 
this matter. New Jersey Governor Donald DiFrancesco released 
a statement after the passage of New Jersey statute which 
emphasized his personal experiences being a father of three; in 
the statement he described “the joys of looking into [his] 
newborn child’s eyes for the first time.”107 He continued that 
the “new law will offer those [New Jersey] couples a better 
chance of having a baby. A better chance of realizing a dream 
many of us take for granted—the dream of becoming a 
parent.”108 
There are a number of themes running through these 
legislative actions. First, some legislatures, like California, are 
medicalizing infertility. It is unknown whether, in 
characterizing infertility as a medical issue, the legislature 
seeks to overtly exclude those from coverage who suffer from 
infertility that is non-medical or whether the legislature simply 
does not address or consider the structurally infertile. 
Another common theme is the significance of infertility in 
terms of both its high incidence and its impact on citizens of the 
state. California emphasizes that millions of citizens struggle 
with infertility, thus highlighting its import, though it is 
unclear whether they include structurally or medico-
 105. Id. 
 106. An Act to Promote Cost Containment, Transparency, and Efficiency in 
the Provision of Quality Health Insurance for Individuals and Small 
Businesses, 2010 Mass. Acts 288. 
 107. News Release, DiFrancesco Signs Law to Provide Health Insurance 
Coverage of Infertility, Office of the Governor (Aug. 31, 2001) (on file at the 
New Jersey State Library). 
 108. Id. 
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structurally infertile persons. New Jersey, interestingly, 
focuses its media release on the social importance of having a 
child, a statement which is presumably neutral to marital 
status and sexual orientation or otherwise not contemplated. 
Some states also focus on the efficacy of treatment as a 
justification for mandating coverage, including California. This, 
again, constitutes an argument in support of ART coverage that 
does not rely on internal factors, like marriage or sexuality. 
Similarly, another theme, affordability and/or reduction of 
waste (Massachusetts), arguably applies equally to all types of 
infertility—medical, structural, or medico-structural.109 
The legislative intent, exhibited in drafting insurance 
coverage mandates for ART, supply a useful context when 
considering possible discriminatory intent on the part of 
legislatures.110 
The next section will discuss some of the legal, ethical, and 
policy considerations raised by state-mandated insurance 
statutes and their implications for gay, unmarried, and medico-
structurally infertile people. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
State-mandated insurance coverage for ART has unique 
legal and ethical implications for the structurally and medico-
structurally infertile. These mandates arise from recognition of 
the emotional toll of untreated infertility and a desire to 
increase access to these expensive technologies.111 However, 
 109. Here, it is difficult to predict what types of waste the legislatures may 
have meant in the context of ART. However, data supports the notion that 
where insurance covers ART, multiple births (and thus the overwhelming 
costs associated with prenatal and maternal care in this context) are reduced. 
Georgina M. Chambers  et al., The Economic Impact of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: A Review of Developed Countries, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2281, 
2292 (2009).One potential reason for this may be that, in IVF cases, women 
choose to implant higher numbers of embryos in instances where they are 
paying out of pocket, in hopes of minimizing the number of ART cycles they 
undergo. Id. Additionally, insurance coverage could prevent waste because full 
coverage allows for individuals to go for the most effective treatment, rather 
than multiple attempts at various less-effective treatments. See Pendo, supra 
note 11, at 342 (explaining that plans with certain ART exclusions may cause 
patients to undergo less effective treatment simply because the less effective 
treatments are covered rather than undergo the more effective treatments 
that are excluded). 
 110. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 111. Numerous studies link infertility with depression and lesser well-
being in women and men. See e.g. Alice D. Domar et al., The Prevalence and 
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state mandates have done little to ensure access for gay and 
unmarried persons including those who, like the individuals 
that the laws aim to protect, have a medical cause for their 
infertility. Indeed, many state mandates are structured in such 
a way as to determine coverage specifically on the basis of 
marital status (and, by proxy, sexual orientation), a 
prerequisite period of unprotected intercourse (again, 
implicating sexual orientation), and/or the existence of a 
medical condition or particular type of medical condition. Given 
procreative liberty considerations, high rates of use of ART by 
gay and unmarried persons, and the fact that ART is the sole 
means of procreation for some of these individuals, it is 
important to explore the consequences of these mandates for 
the structurally and medico-structurally infertile. 
The implicit exclusion of gay, unmarried, and medico-
structurally infertile persons from state-mandated insurance 
coverage of ART, raises three particular legal challenges: 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenges, Equal 
Protection challenges, and Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) challenges. 
A. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Legal Constructs 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
declares that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”112 From this 
protection of human liberty springs a right to privacy, and 
“only personal rights deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of 
personal privacy.”113 Using notions of privacy and fundamental 
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment has often been used as a 
talisman in the battle over reproductive freedom and choice. 
Although a positive right to assisted reproduction has not yet 
and may never be articulated by the courts, there exist a 
Predictability of Depression in Infertile Women, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1158 (1992); Reija Klemetti et al., Infertility, Mental Disorders and Well-
Being—a Nationwide Survey, 89 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA 
SCANDINAVICA 677 (2010). 
 112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
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number of cases that protect a certain level of reproductive 
freedom, particularly in freedoms from unwanted intervention 
by the state in the realm of family and childbearing. 
One of the first U.S. Supreme Court cases to deal with 
procreative liberty was Buck v. Bell, an early 20th century case 
in which the Court upheld a statute mandating compulsory 
sterilization of “mental defectives.”114 Attorneys for Carrie 
Buck argued that mandated sterilization was in violation of her 
due process right to procreate, but the Court ultimately likened 
compulsory sterilization to that of compulsory vaccination and 
held it to be in the state’s interest to have her sterilized.115 The 
concept of a due process right to procreation evolved with 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, in which the Supreme Court held that a 
statute allowing for the sterilization of repeat felons was 
invalid based on the idea that there is a due process right to 
reproduce “which is basic to the perpetuation of a race.”116 
Further shedding light on the boundaries and privileges of 
reproductive choice, the Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut 
that the same due process protections that shield persons from 
involuntary sterilization also afford one the right to choose to 
prevent pregnancy by using contraception.117 Seven years later, 
the Court extended that same protection to individuals who are 
not married by stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”118 Thus, the right to engage in 
procreation and sex, regardless of marital status, was protected 
under the Due Process Clause and notions of sexual intercourse 
for reproductive purposes began to pull away from notions of 
sexual intercourse for other reasons. As one scholar 
summarized it, these court cases all “stand for a constitutional 
right to procreate regardless of marital status.”119 Landmark 
cases like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
 114. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
 117. This case held that it was unconstitutional to ban the use of 
contraceptives for married persons under a penumbra rights theory under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 118. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 119. DeLair, supra note 33, at 178. 
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further evidenced a strong commitment of the Court to defining 
procreative autonomy as grounded in due process privacy 
protections.120 Further, a woman’s right to choose abortion 
“irrespective of her marital status” has been interpreted as 
further bolstering the concept that procreative rights and 
freedoms are grounded in the individual, not the married 
couple.121 
To date, the court system has mainly framed the due 
process privacy rights related to procreation as negative rights, 
meaning a right to be free from government intervention into 
the individual’s procreative activities.122 This is distinguishable 
from a positive right to procreate, where the government would 
be obligated to provide one with the means necessary to do 
so.123 Though courts have made no clear ruling on this matter, 
cases like Harris v. McRae,124 where the Court held that 
women had no positive right to financial assistance from the 
government in order to procure an abortion despite having a 
negative right to an abortion, demonstrate a “reluctance to 
extend the right to procreate” into the realm of positive 
obligations.125 Given this unwillingness to acknowledge a 
positive right to procreate in more traditional senses, courts are 
even less likely to declare a positive right to high-tech, 
expensive, and third-party-dependent interventions like ART 
because where it would be more challenging for a court to 
 120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153. (1973). (“The right of privacy, whether 
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“Roe is clearly 
in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitutional developments have neither 
disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the scope of recognized protection 
accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and 
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.”). 
 121. Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the 
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 677 (1985) [hereinafter Procreation Rights]. 
 122. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 123. Though scholars like John Robertson have examined to what extent 
reproductive liberty has or is worthy of greater protections, this paper will not 
focus on these issues. Instead, it focuses on what legal arguments can be made 
even if reproductive freedom is viewed more narrowly as a negative right with 
lesser government protection. For more information on the debate around 
expanded reproductive protections, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF 
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994). 
 124. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 125. DeLair, supra note 33, at 179. 
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ensure that individuals were given the means necessary to 
reproduce. 
Despite the courts’ apparent reluctance to broaden the 
scope of privacy rights around reproduction, some scholars 
assert that courts already view access to assisted reproductive 
technology as a fundamental right because, while it is 
historically new, it “subsumes several aspects of liberty that 
have a long history of constitutional protection” including 
contraception, abortion, and sterilization.126 On the other hand, 
some scholars argue that there will be no fundamental right to 
ART because, while contraceptive and abortion cases have 
involved the removal of something from one’s body, which 
invokes the protection of bodily integrity, ART involves 
requesting that something be done to one’s body.127 This 
distinction between “freedom from unwanted bodily invasions 
and freedom to obtain bodily invasions” separates ART from 
other rights granted under the fundamental right of 
procreation.128 
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Implications for State-
Mandated Insurance Coverage of ART and Structural and 
Medico-Structural Infertility 
Given the unsettled state of the law in this arena, as well 
as the signs of reluctance within the courts to broadly construe 
reproductive rights, it is unlikely that a structurally or medico-
structurally infertile person would succeed in a claim that a 
state-mandated insurance statute violated his due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Though the government is obligated not to interfere with 
an individual’s right to reproduce, this obligation is likely not 
violated by the state mandates of insurance coverage for ART. 
No federal law requires that individuals have access to ART, 
and, as such, states are acting above their obligations in 
ensuring that certain members of the population have access to 
ART. Regardless of whether these mandates result in unequal 
distribution of or costs for ART across differing marital 
statuses and sexual orientation, they are not outright denying 
any individual access to ART. Instead, they are providing a 
 126. Rhadika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2008). 
 127. Id. at 1465. 
 128. Id. 
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positive right to some, but not others. Thus, the state action of 
mandating insurance for ART is distinguishable from cases like 
Griswold129 and Eisenstadt,130 where the government was 
acting to prohibit or prevent access for individuals. 
Even where the special protections to certain groups like 
unmarried persons or gay persons are considered, a right to 
assisted reproduction is still not afforded. For example, 
Eisenstadt spoke to the idea that unmarried individuals cannot 
be treated differently than married individuals with respect to 
state interference in reproduction or sexual practices.131 
However, while the holding in Eisenstadt is interpreted to 
mean that the unmarried have a right to engage in intercourse 
without procreative intent, this protection does not necessarily 
extend to a right to have insurance pay for them to use ART. 
Cases dealing particularly with homosexual rights to 
privacy in sexual activity also do not seem to ensure insurance 
coverage of ART. In a landmark case for gay rights, Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Supreme Court held that the right to adult, 
consensual intercourse is protected under the due process right 
of privacy, and, thus, anti-sodomy laws are illegal.132 In 
essence, the case held that gay men have as much right to 
privacy in sexual activity as everyone else, even where the 
sexual activity is engaged in for purposes other than 
reproduction.133 Again, however, this case speaks to a negative 
right that the government not interfere in one’s sexual 
practices, not a positive right for the state to enable those 
practices. 
Instances of medico-structural infertility meet the same 
barriers. As with infertile heterosexual married couples, the 
law has yet to afford the positive right to procreate, and it 
 129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
 130. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 131. Id. at 453. 
 132. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
 133. Id. at 578 
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent 
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual 
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. 
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in 
their conduct without intervention of the government.” 
Id. 
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follows that there is no right to ART yet evoked. Irrespective of 
whether unmarried, gay, or medico-structurally infertile 
persons are the group being excluded by law, a state 
government is currently under no obligation to provide access 
to ART for anyone and, thus, can act to provide access to some 
and not others without infringing on the due process privacy 
rights of its citizens. State mandates that implicitly exclude 
these groups either by requiring marriage, unprotected sex, or 
medical necessity are not in violation of the Due Process Clause 
under current interpretations of the law. This does not mean 
that a court can never find a due process privacy right being 
infringed upon by state-mandated insurance coverage of ART 
on behalf of the structurally infertile. Rather, current law and 
current behaviors of the courts tend to suggest that this 
freedom would not be recognized at this point in time. As 
notions of reproductive freedom continue to develop and as 
technologies like ART continue to become more mainstream, 
courts may more readily be willing to acknowledge a positive 
right of reproduction and even ART. If such a positive right 
were recognized, it would reinforce claims that a state mandate 
excluding groups with structural or medico-structural 
infertility from mandated insurance is a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process violation. 
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION 
CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Legal Constructs 
Another potential area where claims of unequal access to 
reproductive technology may be raised is through the Equal 
Protection Clause, which requires equal treatment of those who 
are similarly situated. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause requires that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”134 Equal Protection claims can involve three different 
levels of scrutiny—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and 
rational basis scrutiny—depending on the basis by which the 
challenged law classifies people.135 The highest level of 
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is applied to laws that implicate 
fundamental rights or that use so-called “suspect 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 135. DeLair, supra note 33 at 181. 
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classifications” based on race, national origin, or religion. Strict 
scrutiny requires that the government demonstrate that the 
law and its use of classifications are necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to be as 
least restrictive on individual rights as possible.136 
Intermediate scrutiny is applied to challenges of a law’s 
constitutionality based on its use of “quasi-suspect 
classifications” of gender or illegitimacy and requires that the 
government prove that the classification serves an important 
state interest to which the classification is substantially 
related.137 Most equal protection claims are subject to a 
rational basis standard where the law does not implicate a 
fundamental right or use suspect or quasi-suspect 
classifications, as is the case with marriage status, sexual 
orientation, and disability. For a law having discriminatory 
effects on these bases to be found unconstitutional under 
rational basis review, the challenger must show that the law is 
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.138 
Furthermore, violations of Equal Protection do not always 
require that the law classify a group and discriminate on its 
face. As shown in Washington v. Davis, violations of equal 
protection are also present where there is evidence of 
discriminatory intent.139 Importantly, “a law or other official 
act is [not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact . . . . Disproportionate impact is not 
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious 
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”140 To 
prove discriminatory intent, it must be shown that the law was 
enacted to lead to a particular discriminatory result—a 
discriminatory side-effect or consequence of the law is 
insufficient.141 For example, discriminatory intent could be 
proven by showing that “the discrimination is very difficult to 
explain on nonracial grounds.”142 
Courts have examined issues of reproductive equality in 
many of the same cases discussed in the previous section, 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
 140. Id. at 230, 242. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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though these cases have been specific to laws directly 
interfering with the rights of certain people to exercise 
reproductive freedom. The courts’ positions in these cases, 
however, still provide a starting point from which to consider 
how a court might go about performing a rational basis review 
for an Equal Protection claim in the instance of state insurance 
mandates for ART. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,143 
the Supreme Court struck down the compulsory sterilization 
law because “it discriminated between chicken thieves and 
embezzlers.”144 The Court elaborates that “strict scrutiny of the 
classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is 
essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious 
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals 
in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal 
laws.”145 One scholar has argued that, based on this holding, 
“[a] law that prohibits ARTs under some circumstances, but not 
others, must at the very least be based upon a legitimate 
governmental interest in order to be constitutional.”146 
Examining the holdings in Eisenstadt147 (where the Court 
struck down a law that discriminated between married and 
non-married persons with respect to contraception) and 
Lawrence v. Texas148 (where the Court struck down a law 
forbidding homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy) the 
scholar further argues that: 
a law limiting ARTs to married persons or to heterosexual persons 
should fail because it would treat the very same act—the use of a 
particular technology—differently based upon the marital status or 
sexual preference of the persons involved, with no real basis for the 
distinction other than societal disapproval or prejudice.149 
These issues become highly complex when the discrimination is 
non-facial, as is often the case in state-mandated insurance 
coverage of ART. 
Specifically with respect to unmarried persons and their 
use of reproductive technology, one scholar has argued strongly 
 143. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 144. Rao, supra note 126, at 1474. 
 145. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 146. Rao, supra note 126, at 1475. 
 147. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 148. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 149. Rao, supra note 126, at 1475–76. This argument was used to challenge 
an Italian law which facially discriminated against gay, unmarried person in 
distribution of ART. Id. at 1476. 
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for heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection claims.150 Arguing 
that the state has an interest in protecting “legitimate family 
relationships,” the author writes that “both marital and 
nonmarital families can foster the familial values the 
Constitution seeks to protect . . . .” “[C]ertain ‘objective 
characteristics’—blood relationship with their children, 
parental duty to support those children, parental intention to 
form a family . . . should locate their families at the intimate 
end of the relationship ‘spectrum,’” thus ensuring them 
heightened equal protection review.151 This argument can 
naturally be extended to gay persons wishing to procreate via 
ART as well. 
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Implications for 
State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of ART and Structural 
and Medico-Structural Infertility 
To prove that any of the state-mandated insurance statutes 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is 
a challenging endeavor. Most of the statutes do not, on their 
face, discriminate on the basis of a classification. Of the five 
different categories of language shown in Tables 1a and 1b, 
only those statutes that use spousal language could be 
considered facially discriminatory because they require that 
eligible participants be spouses, implying that only married 
individuals qualify under the law. The remaining types of 
statutes, while they may have discriminatory effects, do not 
contain any facially discriminatory language. 
Though marriage has been viewed as a fundamental right 
in the courts, state mandates with marriage requirements do 
not put discriminatory barriers in front of the right to marry.152 
Rather, they provide certain privileges to those who are 
married and are, thus, more akin to cases like Eisenstadt.153 In 
addressing equal protection issues in Eisenstadt, the Court 
performed a rational basis analysis and overturned the 
Massachusetts law for “providing dissimilar treatment for 
married and unmarried persons.”154 In Eisenstadt, the state 
 150. Procreation Rights, supra note 121, at 680. 
 151. Id. at 679–80. 
 152. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 153. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 154. Id. at 454. 
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argued that one justification for the differing treatment of non-
married persons with respect to contraception was to diminish 
instances of premarital sex.155  Similarly, laws in Hawaii,156 
Maryland,157 and Texas158 treat those who are married 
differently from those who are not in matters related to 
procreation and reproductive choice and may be handled 
similarly to Eisenstadt in a court. However, the state interest of 
reducing premarital sex would be irrelevant because these 
state mandates do not involve sexual intercourse but rather 
reproduction without intercourse. 
The other four statutory constructs do not facially 
discriminate on the basis of marriage or sexual orientation; 
therefore, discriminatory intent would need to be proven in 
order for an Equal Protection claim to succeed. As Tables 1a, 
1b, and 2 suggest,159 statutory language in some states appears 
more definitive and intentional in its exclusion of unmarried or 
gay persons than that of others. For example, a requirement of 
medical necessity seems to seek to exclude structurally infertile 
people (that is, unmarried or gay persons who are 
reproductively healthy but require gamete donation and/or 
artificial insemination to procreate) if medical necessity is 
understood to mean medical infertility.160 The same result is 
true for requirements that the infertility be either medically 
related or unexplained. Similarly, laws requiring a period of 
unprotected intercourse may have the effect of excluding gay 
people who do not engage in intercourse with a member of the 
opposite sex.161 For these types of statutes, it would not be 
enough to prove that the statute results in differing outcomes 
or treatment for gay or unmarried persons than for married, 
heterosexual persons. Rather, it would have to be proven that it 
was the state’s intent to exclude these groups purposefully from 
coverage for discriminatory reasons and, further, that the state 
does not have a rational basis for the law. 
In determining discriminatory intent, as Davis suggests, a 
 155. Id. at 448. 
 156. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005). 
 157. MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 158. TEX. INS. CODE § 1366.005 (West 2009). 
 159. See supra Parts III, III.A.5. 
 160. DeLair, supra note 33, at 175. 
 161. See Rank, supra note 7, at 139 (explaining that although legislatures 
likely did not “intend[] to extend coverage to lesbian couples, it is conceivable 
that the language . . . be construed to include such couples”). 
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law could be struck down by the Equal Protection Clause if the 
reason for distinguishing two groups could be no other reason 
than discriminatory purposes.162 The legislative histories 
explored earlier in the paper provide some guidance here. 
Those states which medicalize infertility might arguably be 
accused of having discriminatory intent to exclude gay and 
unmarried people, by focusing only on medical infertility, thus 
excluding only those kinds of infertility which gay and 
unmarried people experience. However, this interpretation is 
unlikely because it can also be said that California simply did 
not contemplate the structurally infertile in its laws or found 
medical infertility to be the better target of mandated health 
insurance coverage. Interestingly, California is not one of the 
states requiring that the infertility be either medically 
explained or medically necessary, as shown in Tables 1a and 
1b.163  The other factors predominant in the legislative 
histories (significance of infertility, efficacy of treatment, 
affordability, and waste reduction) are neutral to sexual 
orientation and marital status. While this suggests that 
legislative histories are unlikely to unveil discriminatory 
intent, it also suggests that the legislatures should not object, 
based on their goals of the law, to coverage for 
structurally/medico-structurally infertile persons. This is 
because the reasons for implementing the laws arguably apply 
as soundly to these types of infertility.164 
Whether the state’s interest in excluding gay and 
unmarried persons from coverage has a rational basis must 
also be considered. One interest states might argue is that the 
purpose of the mandates is to exclude from coverage those 
heterosexual people who are able to reproduce naturally, thus 
preserving resources.165 Similarly, a state might argue that 
coverage should only be provided for those people who likely 
require more expensive ART interventions that they may not 
be able to afford without insurance coverage (likely the 
 162. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 163. See supra Part III. 
 164. It is important to note that the study of legislative histories here is not 
exhaustive. More in-depth research could in fact reveal evidence of 
discriminatory intent by some states. 
 165. See In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099 (stating that 
mandates, in general, can be viewed as having “the effect of diverting already 
scarce health care resources to one particular health problem”). 
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medically infertile) but that coverage should exclude those who 
require less expensive interventions like artificial insemination 
which they might be able to afford out-of-pocket. A true 
analysis of the validity of these interests requires economic 
analysis which is outside the scope of this work. However, it is 
important to note that furthering these interests does not 
require completely excluding gay and unmarried persons. 
Rather, the laws could simply be modified to state that only 
persons who are unable to reproduce naturally are covered 
and/or additionally that only those procedures which cannot be 
achieved by less expensive means are covered. 
States might also argue an interest in preserving the 
status of marriage and traditional families or, on a related 
note, argue the necessity of safeguarding children’s “emotional 
and psychological wellbeing,” which they would suggest was 
compromised by having a single or gay parent(s).166 This is a 
common argument advanced by states in past cases about 
custody and adoption rights of gay and unmarried persons. 
While it has had some historical success, more recent cases and 
statutes suggest a growing tolerance where most courts would 
no longer recognize this as a compelling argument for excluding 
these groups from parenting.167 
A long history exists regarding the struggle for single 
persons and gay persons seeking custody of children born via 
ART. Central to this history is the inability of gay persons to 
legally marry, the belief that gay persons are involved in short-
term relationships, as well as the belief that gay persons and 
single persons are inadequate at parenting children.168 
Research, however, does not support either the notion that gay 
people cannot maintain stable relationships or that single and 
 166. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 181–82. 
 167. See cases cited infra note 174. 
 168. See e.g. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324, 332 (2005) (noting 
that the same-sex marriage debate is linked to the current access to ART 
controversy and furthering “that gays and lesbians are equally competent 
parents and that their children are as well-adjusted as other children”). Gay 
marriage is currently legal in six states (Connecticut, California, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) as well as the District of 
Columbia. The issue got recent attention in 2010, when California courts 
overturned Proposition 8 and again permitted gay persons to marry in the 
state. Judge Gives Green Light for Same-Sex Marriage in California, CNN 
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homosexual parenting is less effective than heterosexual, 
married parenting.169 
In the past, many courts and legislatures objected to or 
simply did not contemplate gay and unmarried persons in the 
role of parents, whether through adoption or through custodial 
rights. One example is the original Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA), promulgated in 1973, which simply did not discuss 
unmarried women’s use of ART, “leaving them vulnerable to 
parental claims by [gamete] donors.”170 Since then, however, 
the 2002 UPA has been updated to treat married and 
unmarried parents equally.171 Likewise, all of the states who 
have mandated insurance coverage of ART also provide 
adoption rights to gay persons and single persons by statute.172 
 169. For example, studies support the idea that heterosexual and 
homosexual relationships can be equally stable or unstable and long or short 
term. Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent 
Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 551, 553 (1983) (“[I]t seems doubtful whether transience is any 
more characteristic of lesbian relationships than of women’s heterosexual 
relationships.”); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 
63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1025 (1992) (finding “no evidence that the development 
of children with lesbian or gay parents is compromised in any significant 
respect relative to that among children of heterosexual parents in otherwise 
comparable circumstances”); Daniel Goleman, Studies Find No Disadvantage 
in Growing Up in a Gay Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at C14 
 170. Ellen Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development and 
Regulation of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 16 
HEALTH MATRIX 65, 92 (2006); See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B 
U.L.A. 378, 378–79 (1973.) 
 171. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm#TOC1_1. 
 172. For a comprehensive exploration of all state statutes in this area, see 
In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL,  http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/ 
(last visited March 29, 2011). It is important to note that, for gay couples, 
adoption rights are important but second parent adoptions, which enable the 
non-genetically related partner to adopt the child, are also key. The statutes 
which permit adoption by gay persons are as follows: Arkansas permits “[a]n 
unmarried adult” to adopt, ARK. CODE ANN. §9-9-204 (2009); in California, 
“[a]ny a prospective adoptive parent . . . [must] be at least 10 years older than 
the child,” CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601 (West 2004); Connecticut allows for 
consideration of ”the capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to meet such 
needs [particular needs of child]” but does not have specific adoption 
restrictions based on sexual orientation, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726 (West 
2004); in Hawaii, “[a]ny proper adult person, not married, or any person 
married to the legal father or mother of a minor child, or a husband and wife 
jointly” may petition for adoption, HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-1 (2006); in Illinois, 
“[a] reputable person of legal age and of either sex” may adopt a child, 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 50/2 (2011); Maryland courts consider “all factors necessary to 
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Additionally, while historically there has been strong case law 
which did not welcome single parents; this has begun to change 
in the courts.173 In cases which grant custody or adoption rights 
to gay persons, the courts have focused on the best interests of 
the child and have concluded either that the inclusion of the 
single or gay parent supports these interests, or at a minimum, 
that the sexual orientation alone cannot proscribe custody 
without some other evidence of actual harm to the child from 
the sexual orientation of the parent or from another reason.174 
Thus, overall, courts and legislatures in most states are 
becoming open to the idea of single and gay persons as parents, 
making it unlikely in the majority of states that fitness to 
parent or traditional models of family could be used as a 
rational basis for excluding these groups from mandated 
coverage of ART. 
Other state interests may vary depending on the types of 
treatment being excluded. As one example, the spousal 
requirement may be intended to exclude gamete donors. Here, 
the state might argue that insurance companies cannot be 
expected to handle additional expenses of gamete donation, in 
determine the prospective adoptee’s best interests” and cannot deny “petition 
solely because petitioner . . . is single or unmarried,” MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 5-3B-19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Massachusetts requires only “[a] 
person of full age,” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, §1 (LexisNexis 2003); in 
Montana, “an unmarried” adult may adopt, MONT. CODE ANN. 42-1-106 
(2009); in New Jersey, “[a]ny [adult] person” may adopt, N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-
43 (West 2002); New York requires “[a]n adult unmarried person,” N. Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2010); Ohio requires, “[a]n unmarried adult,”  Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §3107.03 (LexisNexis 2008); in Rhode Island, “[a]ny person” 
may adopt, R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-7-4 (2003); in Texas, “any adult” may adopt, 
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §162.001 (West 2008); and in West Virginia, “[a]ny 
person not married” may adopt, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-201 (LexisNexis 
2009). 
 173. For an excellent overview of the cases denying women as single 
parents in favor of inclusion of donor fathers, see Waldman, supra note 170, at 
92–96. 
 174. In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1031 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988) (“Evidence of one parent's homosexuality, without a link to detriment to 
the child, is insufficient to constitute harm."); Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 
N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("[H]omosexuality standing alone 
without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not 
render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the 
child.") (emphasis added); Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 674 (Md. 1998) 
(“[W]e agree with those courts from other jurisdictions that have held that the 
primary consideration in . . . custody proceedings is not the sexual lifestyle or 
conduct of the parent, but whether the child will suffer harm from the 
behavior of the parent . . . .”). 
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addition to the other services they are providing or that gamete 
donation is against the policies of the state. However, these 
types of limitations, if valid, can again simply be altered by 
specifying this in the statue; thus removing gamete donation 
but not also excluding unmarried and gay persons. 
Despite the willingness of courts and legislatures to 
recognize the structurally infertile as appropriate parents, 
equal protection challenges here still remain difficult unless 
discriminatory intent can be proven. Equal protection 
challenges would be strongest when brought against the state 
mandates with spousal language because there is some 
evidence of unequal treatment surrounding the fundamental 
right of marriage. While such an equal protection challenge 
could be complex, it does present a stronger challenge to state-
mandated insurance coverage than Due Process challenges, 
particularly where the statutes discriminate facially on the 
basis of marriage. 
C. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT CONSIDERATIONS 
1. ADA Legal Constructs 
Another potential claim with respect to state-mandated 
insurance for ART is the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)175 and its respective legal claims. Specifically, Title II of 
the ADA deals with government violations. Title II applies to 
“any State or local government,” which includes state 
legislatures in their role of making laws.176 
Title  II provides that no “qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”177 A person has a disability 
under the ADA if he or she has a “physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities,” has “a record of such an impairment,” or is 
“regarded as having such an impairment.”178 Infertility was 
 175. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 176. Id. §§ 12131(1)(A). 
 177. Id. § 12132. 
 178. Id. § 12102(1). 
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famously held to be disability in Bragdon v. Abbott where the 
Supreme Court ordered that reproduction was a major life 
activity when an HIV-positive patient brought suit against a 
dentist who refused to perform certain dental procedures on 
her in his office.179 The Court stated that “[r]eproduction and 
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life 
process itself,”180 and “found that the HIV infection 
substantially limited her ability to reproduce and bear children, 
thus drawing protection under the ADA.”181 More recently, the 
ADA Amendments of 2008 listed reproductive functions as a 
major life activity within the meaning of the ADA.182 
Under Title II a qualified individual with a disability is “an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or 
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public 
entity.”183 Thus, a) modification to rules and policies is one way 
in which a public entity like a state must accommodate a 
person with a disability and b) that modification need only be 
made if it is reasonable.  The state must make these reasonable 
modifications to policies to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability unless it can be demonstrated “that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity.”184 Under this provision, a state 
statute which excluded a woman with both multiple sclerosis 
and schizophrenia from a state program that helped enable 
physically disabled persons to live at home did not to violate 
 179. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 180. Id. at 638. 
 181. Jessica L. Hawkins, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated 
Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 
210 (2007). 
 182. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, available at 
http://www.access-board.gov/about/laws/ada-amendments.htm. For a 
discussion of the legal and ethical considerations which led to infertility being 
considered a disability requiring reasonable accommodation  as well as how 
this is supported by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) 
guidelines, see Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility: 
Fertile Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1996). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 
 184. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2011). 
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the ADA.185 In Easley, the woman was not able to participate in 
the program because she was not mentally alert.186 The court 
did not think it a reasonable modification to the policy to 
include her through use of a surrogate decision-maker because 
mental alertness is a necessary prerequisite for the services to 
be provided.187 The court clarified that this is not case of 
discrimination against a group or sub-group because of 
disability. “On the contrary, this is a case where an additional 
handicap . . . renders participation in the program 
ineffectual.”188 Quoting another case, the court added that 
there is no requirement that “any benefit extended to one 
category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other 
categories of handicapped persons.”189 In another case from the 
same circuit, Juvelis, a mentally disabled boy was allowed to be 
included in special benefits for the mentally disabled, even 
though he was not able to declare his domicile—which was part 
of the process to qualify for the program—because making an 
exception would not modify the essential nature of the 
program.190 The court reasoned that the program was intended 
for people with that particular type of disability and his 
inability to determine his domicile did not disrupt the 
objectives of the program or alter his ability to participate in 
the program.191 
2. ADA Implications for State-Mandated Insurance Coverage 
of ART and Structural and Medico-Structural Infertility 
The ADA and case law like Bragdon make clear that 
reproductive function is a major life activity and the inability to 
reproduce is a disability under the ADA. There is still, however, 
a question as to what this means for structurally and medico-
structurally infertile individuals. Reproduction is a major life 
activity for gay and unmarried persons, regardless of whether 
their infertility is solely structural or both medical and 
 185. Easley ex rel. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297 (3d. Cir. 1994). 
 186. Id. at 299. 
 187. Id. at 306. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 305, (citing Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1987)). 
 190. Juvelis ex rel. Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 656 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
 191. Id. 
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structural. However, Bragdon would likely not support the 
premise that gay or unmarried persons with healthy 
reproductive function are disabled under the meaning of the 
ADA.192 For medico-structurally infertile persons, the reason 
for which they cannot reproduce is linked to a physical 
impairment, as well as a structural one. Thus, under the ADA, 
medico-structurally infertile persons should qualify as disabled 
like other people with medical-based infertility.193 While 
persons with structural infertility are limited in this major life 
activity as well, it is not due to a physical impairment and thus, 
though ultimately a matter for the legislature and the courts, 
does not likely fall under the meaning of a disability under the 
ADA. 
While accommodation by modifying state mandates to 
include medico-structural infertility is a possibility, another 
question is whether a court would find this reasonable, or more 
specifically, whether such a modification would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the services. For those states which have 
some medical component built into the mandate (Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and 
Texas) or for those states that have medicalization as part of 
their legislative intent (California) it appears that medico-
structurally infertile people would fare very similar to the 
plaintiff in the Juvelis case. The fact that these individuals 
may have to go through extra steps to establish medical 
infertility does not seem to alter the fundamental purpose of 
the statute, which is to provide insurance coverage for 
procedures dealing with medical infertility. They are still 
 192. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 193. Interestingly, however, while same sex couples or unmarried people 
may not be able to show that a physical impairment prevents the ability to 
reproduce, as in Bragdon, with HIV they may be able to satisfy the substantial 
limitation prong. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624. In Bragdon, a woman with HIV 
was viewed as substantially impaired with regards to her ability to procreate 
because she was HIV positive and was unable to find an individual willing to 
procreate with her. Id. Thus, while she had a medical condition, it was more 
the fact that she could not find a partner to procreate with (indirectly a result 
of her illness) which made her infertile, not an actual medical condition that 
prevented her reproductive system from working. In this way, unmarried 
persons could be argued to be infertile if they cannot find a partner with whom 
they wish to procreate, or same-sex couples could be viewed as infertile 
because they are not naturally able to produce children. However, the fact that 
unmarried persons and same sex couples would not have a medical condition 
that caused their constructive infertility would likely bar them from protection 
under the ADA. 
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qualified individuals with the same disability for which the 
state is providing services and the fact that they are gay or 
unmarried does not render these services ineffectual if 
treatment will work for them. Unlike Easley, this reading of the 
statute does not open the gates for people with other 
disabilities to be included, but instead solely sticks to the 
disability of infertility. 
As one court put it, the purpose of the ADA is to deal both 
with invidious discrimination of those with disabilities and also 
sheer indifference and apathy.194 States without mandates for 
the medico-structurally infertile may not have adequately 
considered their exclusion from coverage because these groups 
are often not infertile in the same way as the medically 
infertile. However, the medico-structurally infertile nonetheless 
benefit from the same treatments and insurance coverage as 
the medically infertile. Denying them coverage in this way 
would be akin to denying seeing eye dogs for persons who are 
blind because of a congenital defect but providing seeing eye 
dogs to those with trauma-related blindness. If both are equally 
blind and require the use of a seeing eye dog, then why should 
the origin of the disability matter? However, in these states, a 
court may view the difference between medically and medico-
structurally infertile individuals more akin to Easley because, if 
the intent of the law was to treat medical infertility, other 
forms of infertility may alter the nature of the coverage in some 
way. In this case, the state would need to advance an adequate 
argument for why this inclusion would go against the purpose 
of the policy. 
For those states which do not have some medical mandate 
in their statutes, it is less clear what the intent of the laws 
were and thus it is harder to see whether inclusion of medico-
structurally infertile would alter the original purpose of the 
program. However, the same values and considerations 
articulated above would apply. While the ADA does not call for 
similar treatment of all people with different types of 
disabilities, it does call for similar treatment of persons with 
the same disability under a given program or policy. Thus there 
should be equivalent treatment of the same condition of 
infertility regardless of origin under a given law. 
In summary, constitutional and ADA protections in the 
 194. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296–97 (1985). 
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areas of reproductive freedom and assisted reproduction, as 
well as state-mandated insurance for these treatments, are 
somewhat complex, unclear, and still developing. While many 
of the state mandates do not appear to violate constitutional 
and other legal protections explicitly, there are a few troubling 
areas. For example, some of the mandates, such as those 
requiring marriage or those requiring medical or unexplained 
causes for infertility, may be vulnerable to Equal Protection 
challenges. Likewise, those statutes that exclude medico-
structurally infertile persons may be susceptible to ADA 
claims. These legal concerns, along with other important 
ethical and practical considerations discussed in the next 
section, raise important questions for policymakers, legislators, 
and academics about the purpose and goal of state-mandated 
insurance coverage of ART and the role of the state therein. 
D. PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPETING 
INTERESTS IN STATE-MANDATED INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ART 
As the catalogue of state mandates that require insurance 
coverage of ART suggests, though it may be unwritten or often 
unacknowledged, these statutes mainly intend to promote 
heterosexual, monogamous, married family development. 
Between the lines, gay and single persons are excluded from 
being ensured the same fertility benefits as other individuals. 
While state statutes may leave out gay and unmarried persons 
from coverage, these individuals depend on ART to reproduce 
genetically-related offspring, and ART is growing increasingly 
popular as a way of making family life possible. However, the 
issue of state-mandated insurance coverage for infertility, both 
generally and in the context of gay and unmarried persons, is 
contextually situated within a number of other concerns such 
as healthcare justice and resource allocation, religious and 
political issues, and health insurance purpose and theory. To 
better understand how best to move forward with addressing 
the fertility needs of gay and unmarried persons, these factors 
must be considered. 
1. Healthcare Justice and Resource Allocation 
There has been much legal, policy, and ethical debate over 
notions of healthcare justice and equity, particularly in light of 
recent discussions around universal healthcare and healthcare 
reform more generally. While a prolonged discussion of 
healthcare justice is outside the scope of this paper, a few 
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general principles are important to discuss. Norman Daniels 
famously stated, “[H]ealthcare was special because of its 
impact on opportunity” and the “central function of health care 
is to maintain normal functioning.”195 “Healthcare preserves. . . 
the ability to participate in the political, social, and economic 
life of their society. It sustains them as fully participating 
citizens . . . in all spheres of social life.”196 This broad notion of 
health has been echoed in areas of the law, such as the ADA, 
where we focus on impairments that limit major life activities 
rather than just the illness or disease itself.197 Closely related, 
if the goals of health policy are to promote “human flourishing,” 
then health insurance should help individuals to “function best, 
given their circumstances, and thus reduce the vulnerability 
associated with ill health.”198 
Healthcare justice and distributive justice issues 
necessarily raise the question of what should be considered 
healthcare in this context. Narrow definitions of healthcare 
that rely solely on the disease model fall short in the world of 
infertility. “[M]ost would acknowledge that bearing and raising 
children contributes significantly to the parents’ well-being,” 
and the ability to reproduce for those who wish it is part of 
“normal species functioning.”199 Decisions about who can or 
cannot have access to infertility treatments implicate who will 
be able to reproduce and bring into the world and raise the next 
generation, thus touching on major issues of reproductive 
rights and the government’s role in population control. 
Infertility is a complex medical and social condition that 
can be uniquely a “couple” problem rather than an “individual” 
problem and which can often have no identified medical cause. 
As the state mandates themselves suggest, solely linking 
infertility to a medical cause is problematic. While eight of the 
fourteen mandates require some type of medical cause of 
medical necessity, half of these admit that the cause can either 
 195. Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Health Care, 1 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 2, 2 (2001). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006). 
 198. J.P. Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q J. MED 
53, 53, 55–57 (2006). 
 199. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 127, 177 (2009) (quoting NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: 
MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 34, 59 (2008)). 
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be medical or unexplained.200 Furthermore, in the context of 
the structurally and medico-structurally infertile, the division 
between medically-based and non-medically based infertility 
seems irrelevant. Medically infertile persons and structurally 
infertile persons are equally desirous of and dependent on ART 
to reproduce. If broader notions of health are adopted, the focus 
should be on impact of the condition on life and functioning, not 
the disease itself. Thus, the focus should be on the inability to 
reproduce, regardless of whether it is caused by a medical 
disease or otherwise. This argument is also in concert with 
classic theories of healthcare needs and distributive justice, 
which include “non-medical personal (and social) support 
services” within the broader definition of healthcare needs.201 If 
the state mandates were solely intended to treat strictly 
medically-defined models of infertility, then, at a minimum, 
medico-structurally infertile persons must be covered, even if 
including gay and unmarried persons may not be required. But 
because these mandates do cover infertility which has no 
medical basis, we should consider whether to broaden them 
under theories of health justice to include unmarried and gay 
persons because all groups are seeking the same end result of 
procreation. 
John Robertson has also argued that the focus should be on 
the human interest of reproduction rather than on a strict 
medical definition. He wrote: 
The label of “natural” or “medical” becomes a way to hide a normative 
judgment about the importance of reproduction to gay and lesbian 
persons . . . the question then becomes whether unmarried persons, 
whatever their gender or sexual orientation, have an important 
human interest or need in reproducing. If they do, then they should 
not be excluded from ART services provided to others.202 
Alternatively, if state mandates wish to pursue or continue 
to pursue a more narrow reading of the statutes, then notions 
of healthcare justice would require that they do so across the 
board. If medically-derived infertility really does deserve to be 
 200. These states are Hawaii, Texas, and Maryland. See supra Table 2. 
 201. Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146, 158 (1981). Daniels uses the analogy of Medicaid to 
support the notion of broader health needs. If Medicaid is solely intended to 
promote narrow definitions of healthcare, then funds cannot be used to 
support abortions. However,  if Medicaid “should serve other important goals, 
like ensuring that poor and well-off women can equally well control their 
bodies, then there is justification for funding abortions.” Id. at 157 n.19. 
 202. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 331 (2005). 
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prioritized or completely privileged over structural infertility, 
then legislatures should provide good reasons for why this type 
of infertility deserves such treatment and how exclusion of 
structural infertility is justified. Furthermore, any states that 
allow for any infertility treatment that is non-medical should 
discontinue doing so. Thus, Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas 
should discontinue providing services to those who have 
“unexplained” causes for infertility.203 
Mandated insurance coverage has also raised a number of 
health justice concerns more generally. Some have argued that 
state mandates are unjust because they divert scarce health 
resources to one particular health need.204 Countering this, 
others argue that insurance coverage to treat infertility should 
be mandated because insurance companies have adversely 
selected against it and such mandates are, thus, necessary to 
widen access to such treatments.205 Others argue that 
infertility should not be prioritized because it is not a lethal 
condition, and resources should be prioritized to life-saving 
treatments.206 In opposition to this, some raise the issue of 
multiple births explaining that “infertile patients who pay out-
of-pocket for these treatments have a financial incentive to 
achieve pregnancy with their first attempt, and they are often 
willing to accept the risks associated with a multiple birth in 
order to maximize their chances of pregnancy.”207 If insurance 
covers IVF, patients will be more likely to select a procedure 
 203. See supra Table 2. 
 204. See, e.g., In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099. 
 205. See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176; In Vitro Fertilization, supra 
note 6, at 2099.  See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176. 
 206. Hawkins, supra note 181, at 224, 225 n.5.  In conjunction with this, 
ART is a challenging endeavor which often requires multiple rounds of 
treatment in order to achieve a successful live birth. For example, according to 
a 2007 CDC report, of 101,897 fresh non-donor ART cycles that were started, 
29% resulted in a live birth. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2007 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY REPORT 6 (2009) [hereinafter CDC 
ART Report], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2007/PDF/COMPLETE_2007_ART.pdf. 
 207. Hawkins, supra note 181, at 223. In 2003, 34% of all live births 
conceived via IVF were multiples compared with 3% in the general population. 
Id. at 222. “A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found 
that the number of embryos transferred per IVF cycle was lower in states that 
required complete coverage of IVF than in states that mandated partial or no 
coverage. Consequently, the states with mandated coverage had a lower 
percentage of pregnancies of triplets or more than in the other states.” Id. at 
223–24. 
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based on safety than on finances, thus reducing the harms 
associated with multiple births, including premature labor, 
hypertension, hemorrhage, and gestational labor for the mother 
and various physical, developmental, and mental disabilities or 
death for the child.208 
At the core of this debate is the issue of how best and how 
justly to allocate scarce medical resources. It is important to 
note, first, that there is a huge and central debate about 
focusing on infertility as a primary area for allocating scarce 
health resources. This paper does not discuss whether it is 
ethical, just, or practical even to allocate resources for fertility 
treatment over other health treatments. Instead, it suggests 
that, if society wishes to allocate these resources in such a 
manner, it is problematic from a legal, ethical, and health-
justice perspective to do so only for heterosexual married 
couples. Even if inclusion of gay and unmarried persons 
increases that wedge of health resources, it is important that 
health goods be distributed based on fair distributive justice 
concerns, not based on social characteristics. Thus, if the 
allocated health goods are too great, limitations should be set 
in other manners. 
For example, ART could be prioritized to those people who 
have the greatest need—perhaps because they have fewer 
reproductive years remaining or do not have any other 
children. Alternatively, one could argue that it is preferable to 
give a larger number of persons an opportunity and to provide 
a capped service based on price or number of cycles.209 Under 
this argument, single women and lesbians may be prioritized 
over others because of the low cost of artificial insemination 
compared to ART. 
The source of funding for mandatory coverage of ART is 
also important. For the most part, current mandates require 
that insurance companies either offer or provide coverage, thus 
placing the expense on the insurer and, in turn, the insured via 
premiums. However, a few states have begun efforts to fund 
infertility treatment through state-funded health insurance as 
well. For example, Massachusetts has included infertility 
related costs in its MassHealth comprehensive family planning 
 208. Id. at 222. 
 209. This of course is a version of utilitarianism prioritizing the greatest 
good to the greatest number of people. 
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services for those who qualify by income.210 New York has also 
initiated a “grant program to improve access to infertility 
services” which is funded by the tobacco control and insurance 
initiatives pool.211 Making use of taxpayer dollars to fund 
infertility treatments may argue for a larger legislative and 
taxpayer debate around who should be prioritized by these 
funds. 
2. Health Insurance Theory and Purpose 
State-mandated insurance and coverage for structural 
infertility also implicates issues of the purpose of health 
insurance and the theories supporting it. The basic tenets of 
health insurance involve the transfer of risk from those 
individuals with high healthcare costs to a large pool of low-
risk insured who pay premiums to compensate for losses.212 
While scholars have debated in recent years as to the extent to 
which people make insurance choices based on risk-aversion 
versus income-loss, health insurance involves, at its core, the 
spreading of financial losses associated with healthcare across 
broader pools of persons rather than concentrating those costs 
on single individuals.213 
Within the broader context of insurance, mandated 
insurance coverage for infertility has unique implications. 
Mandated insurance coverage may lead to higher utilization 
which could, in turn, lead to better quality and reduced cost, 
thus helping the structurally infertile to gain access even 
where they are excluded from coverage.214 However, there is 
also a concern that mandates may raise insurance premiums. 
Here, estimates of premium increases vary significantly, with 
some studies approximating lower increases ranging from $2.79 
to $27.00 per member per year while other studies project 
larger increases such as $105 to $175 per member per year.215 
 210. An Act Maximizing Federal Reimbursement for Family Planning 
Services, MASS. ACTS 596 (2005). 
 211. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-v(jj) (McKinney 2010). 
 212. HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 572 (Barry F. 
Furrow et al. eds., West Group 5th. ed. 2001); Ruger, supra note 198, at 53–54. 
 213. John A. Nyman, Health Insurance: The Case of the Missing Welfare 
Gain, 9 EUR. J. OF HEALTH ECON. 369, 380–381 (2008), available at 
http://www.aria.org/rts/proceedings/2005/Nyman%20-%20Vanishing.pdf; 
Ruger, supra note 198, at 53; . 
 214. See In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099. 
 215. One scholar estimates a $7.20 to $27.00 per member per year raise. 
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If inclusion of ART in insurance policies does, indeed, raise 
premiums, then there is an additional justice concern raised 
because gay and unmarried persons would be paying increased 
premiums for a healthcare option that they want but are not 
permitted to access under the plan. Admittedly, while insured 
people cannot opt out of all undesirable situations, say for 
example the case where a non-smoker has to pay larger 
premiums due to smokers in his insurance pool, this is a 
different case.216 In the smoker case, the non-smoker is not 
being denied access to the same care as the smoker, he simply 
does not need it. If he, too, were to later need lung cancer 
treatment, as an example, it would be available to him in the 
same way as the smoker. In the case of gay and unmarried 
persons, and particularly medico-structurally infertile persons, 
they are potentially paying higher premiums for a procedure 
which others are accessing and which they also want but are 
denied. Just as some people have argued that it is unjust to 
expect infertile persons to pay premiums that cover childbirth 
for fertile persons (thus justifying mandated insurance 
coverage of ART more generally), so too is it unjust to require 
gay and unmarried persons to pay premiums to support state-
mandated ART without being able to access these benefits.217 
Rationales for mandating insurance coverage of ART for 
heterosexual married persons remain the same for gay and 
unmarried persons. One author argued that there is a justice 
claim generally which calls for insurance mandates covering 
ART because it would (1) eliminate adverse selection where 
insurers avoid covering infertility and, instead, allow infertility 
risk to be pooled across a larger population, (2) reduce 
suboptimal utilization of ART, thus reducing risk of high order 
multiple births, and (3) benefit infertility patients and the 
children resulting from these treatments while likely harming 
Monahan, supra note 199, at 174. Another study, however, estimates the 
added cost to a standard benefits plan to be only $2.79 per year. Ringo, supra 
note 16, at 880. Yet another study “found that even if utilization of IVF rose 
300% as a result of the procedure being covered by insurance, premiums would 
only increase about nine dollars ($9) per employee per year.” Hawkins, supra 
note 181, at 221. The National Center for Policy Analysis projects one of the 
larger increases at $105–$175. John Goodman & Merrell Matthews, The Cost 
of Health Insurance Mandates, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Aug. 13, 
1997), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba237. 
 216. In-Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099. 
 217. See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176 (arguing that it is unjust to 
require infertile people to pay for insurance). 
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individuals unaffected by infertility minimally.218 The author 
admitted that there may be a risk for moral hazard where a 
larger group of persons unlikely to benefit from ART may 
attempt cycles, but thought this could be minimized by 
concentrating efforts towards those who were most likely to 
have successful ART cycles.219 In the instance of state-
mandated coverage for the structurally-infertile, the arguments 
in favor of mandates remain the same. They too would 
experience minimized adverse selection, would have the choice 
to opt for lower-risk but more expensive technologies that 
reduce multiple birth risks, and they would benefit in the same 
manner as described for heterosexual married persons. In 
addition, because many of the unmarried or gay persons using 
ART would not have medically-problematic reproductive issues, 
their chances of success with ART cycles would likely be higher 
and, in many instances, less expensive, thus reducing moral 
hazard concerns. 
Another insurance issue particular to same-sex couples is 
the lack of availability of domestic partner benefits prevalent 
throughout the country. Even if state-mandated insurance can 
be construed or even altered to protect gay persons, many same 
sex couples find it difficult to find health plans that cover their 
partners. A 2007 poll quotes 20% of persons in same-sex 
couples as being uninsured as compared with 11.5% of married 
individuals.220 In a poll of 402 of the Fortune 500 companies, 
342 offered domestic partner health benefits, with 210 of these 
companies located in a state that offers mandated coverage of 
ART.221 
 218. The author argued that individuals who were infertile would naturally 
benefit from mandated insurance because it would make fertility treatment 
more available to them. Additionally, risk to children would be lessened 
because the reduced risk of multiple births that occur where patients can 
choose less risky, more expensive ART, rather than opting for low-cost, high-
risk procedures. Id. at 181–83. For fertile persons, the concern was that 
increased premiums may cause some individuals to lose insurance, though the 
author expected this figure to be low and arguably outweighed by the benefits 
to the infertile individuals and children. Id. 
 219. The concept of moral hazard, more specifically, worries that 
individuals will expose themselves to greater risks because they have less 
fiscal responsibility for the results. See id. 
 220. Michael Ash & Lee Badgett, Separate and Unequal: The Effect of 
Unequal Access to Employment-Based Health Insurance on Same-Sex and 
Unmarried Different Sex Couples, 24 CONTEMP, ECON. POL’Y 582, 588 (2007). 
 221. Ringo, supra note 16, at 884. 
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3. Political, Religious, and Social Issues 
The battle over whether to include the structurally infertile 
in mandated insurance coverage of infertility is situated within 
a much broader discussion centering on the political rights of 
gay and unmarried persons, religious and political views on 
ART and gay marriage, and the historic battle over parental 
rights of gay and unmarried persons, among other issues. This 
paper does not begin to attempt to summarize the complex 
social, religious, and political pressures that impact legislation 
around this issue, but only raises a few of the important and 
relevant issues and concerns. 
Although beliefs vary by different faiths, religious 
disapproval generally exists against homosexuality, procreation 
outside of marriage, and ART itself. Catholic teachings, for 
example, hold that “procreation should only occur in the 
sanctity of a marriage between a man and a woman.”222 This 
belief makes procreation without intercourse problematic, as 
well as procreation of unmarried individuals, whether single or 
gay. The Jewish faith, in general, is more accepting of ART. 
However, when ART is used by lesbians or unmarried women, 
the resulting children can be considered illegitimate.223 
Further, artificial insemination is considered immoral because 
of the implied need for male masturbation.224 Protestant views 
on ART vary widely, and Islamic views (in Iran at least) do not 
“restrict access to ARTs . . . for married, heterosexual couples,” 
but withhold ART for same-sex couples and single women 
because they view reproduction by those groups as 
undesirable.225 The general religious disfavor of ART, 
homosexuality, and procreation outside of marriage may have 
significant impact on laws and public policy, along with societal 
views on these practices. 
In conjunction, it is important to note that some of the 
states mandating insurance coverage for infertility have 
created statutory protections that allow religious institutions to 
opt out of coverage226 that is “inconsistent with the religious 
 222. DeLair, supra note 33, at 154. 
 223. Id. at 155–56 
 224. Id. at 155–56; Rank, supra note 7, at 124. 
 225. Rank, supra note 7, at 123–24. 
 226. Among states providing religious exemption are California, 
Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas. NCSL, supra note 67. 
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organization’s religious and ethical principles.”227 Given some 
of the religious views discussed above, it would not be 
surprising if religious institutions frequently used these 
statutory protections as a means of avoiding coverage of ART. 
However, it is unclear if institutions have attempted to avoid 
coverage of ART for a structurally infertile person. Interesting 
civil rights and religious rights issues may be raised if a legal 
challenge was brought on behalf of a gay or unmarried person 
because a religious institution was denying ART specifically to 
him or her under one of these mandates. Though this is outside 
the scope of this paper, it is an important area for future 
research and attention. 
In line with religious objections, there is also the possibility 
that personal prejudice or religious views of physicians will 
have an impact at the level of healthcare delivery. One 
California case, North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. 
v. San Diego County Superior Court, struggled with this 
issue.228 A physician in the medical group denied Ms. 
Guadalupe Benitez, a lesbian, access to intrauterine 
insemination for her and her partner based on religious 
objections.229 The California Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment right of free exercise of religion did not guarantee 
a right to deny fertility treatment based on sexual 
orientation.230 Other states have not yet begun to deal with 
this issue in their court systems, but the case highlights 
another area where structural infertility may be impacted. In 
line with this concern, a study published in 2005 suggested 
that fertility clinics believe that it is part of their role to screen 
 227. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.55 (West 2008). Accord CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007) (allowing exemption for “treatment[s] of 
infertility that are contrary to the religious employer’s bona fide religious 
tenets”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring health 
maintenance organizations to cover “basic health services” which include 
“infertility services”). 
 228. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior 
Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). 
 229. Id. at 963–64. 
 230. Id. at 967 (“Here, defendant physicians contend that exposing them to 
liability for refusing to perform the IUI medical procedure for plaintiff 
infringes upon their First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise 
of religion. Not so. As we noted earlier, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 
imposes on business establishments certain antidiscrimination obligations, 
thus precluding any such establishment or its agents from telling patrons that 
it will not comply with the Act.”). 
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potential ART recipients for parental fitness.231 Clinics stated 
numerous considerations and reasons for turning away certain 
candidates. Twenty percent of clinics said they would turn 
down a woman who wanted to parent singly; fifty-three percent 
said they would turn down a single man; and forty-eight 
percent reported being unwilling or unlikely to provide 
treatment to a gay couple wanting to use surrogacy with one of 
the men as a sperm donor.232 If the structurally infertile are 
included in state-mandated insurance coverage, extra care will 
need to be taken to ensure that they are not excluded from 
access at the patient-provider level for religious or personal 
views. 
The state-mandates themselves also raise some clear 
practical issues with respect to implementation and 
application. For example, to whom must it be ultimately proven 
that an individual has engaged in unprotected intercourse for 
the required amount of time, and how can this fact be verified? 
Likewise, what are the implications of such a requirement for 
the transmission of sexually transmitted infections? How 
frequently and how monogamously does one have to engage in 
unprotected intercourse to qualify under such a mandate? 
Additionally, it may be very difficult for medico-structurally 
infertile persons to prove medical infertility or know that they 
are medically infertile if they engage in same-sex intercourse or 
are abstinent. Similarly, how must one prove a number of years 
of infertility, whether it be medically or structurally based, 
what should fall under the heading of medically necessary in 
this arena, and who should decide? Though specific 
requirements in the statute may be necessary to prioritize 
limited resources and to ensure that those with the greatest 
need receive appropriate care, many of the current 
requirements are difficult to prove, ambiguous, and may 
potentially cause public health concerns. 
Insurance coverage of ART for structurally infertile 
persons under state mandates is affected by a number of other 
factors. Gay marriage, religious objections, child welfare and 
custody, among many other considerations, all play into the 
 231. Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273, 275 (2005); Andrea 
D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 63 (2005). 
 232. Crossley, supra note 231, at 275–76; Gurmankin, supra note 231, at 
65. 
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debate around whether gay and unmarried persons should 
have access to ART and whether insurance should cover it. 
Notions of health justice support providing some type of 
coverage of ART for the structurally infertile,233 but the 
complex interplay between political and social issues, as well as 
insurance theory and healthcare allocation, raises the 
challenging question of how best to distribute and ensure 
access to ART for the structurally infertile. The next section 
will explore some of the benefits and drawbacks of possible 
mechanisms of distribution. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR DISTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
The issue of assisted reproduction and insurance is still 
alive and well. Currently, only fourteen states have provided 
some form of mandate that insurance cover ART, and no 
federal laws regulate the issue of whom does or does not have 
access to these technologies.234 Thus, there is large space for 
policy to still develop and change in this area. Three potential 
models and their benefits and drawbacks will be discussed as 
possible mechanisms for remaining states to consider 
broadening access to ART. 
A. TAX REBATES 
Under the tax deduction proposal, costs of assisted 
reproductive technologies can be declared under section 213 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, the medical expense deduction, and 
can be deducted from one’s federal income tax.235 Under the 
current statute, “a taxpayer may claim unlimited expenses for 
fertility technology, but only if the taxpayer can afford to spend 
over 7.5% percent [sic] of his or her income on such 
treatment.”236 Not much is known about the implications of a 
tax credit in this situation as the proposal to use tax credits for 
these purposes is fairly new. However, from a theoretical 
perspective, the tax deduction proposal has a number of 
anticipated benefits as well as a few drawbacks. This proposal 
presumably rids the system of bias based on sexual orientation 
or marital status and instead allows for all persons interested 
 233. Monahan, supra note 199, at 178–79. 
 234. NCSL, supra note 67. 
 235. Ringo, supra note 16, at 887. 
 236. Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1140. 
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in using ART to deduct expenses, thus eliminating issues of 
health injustice. It also resolves the issue that many gay people 
do not have domestic partner benefits because, under the tax 
deduction proposal, one partner can deduct expenses on his or 
her taxes, regardless of insurance status.237 However, it does 
not resolve issues at the provider-patient level. Though the tax 
deduction method also widens the ability for some to access 
ART, it does not provide further options for those who lack the 
finances to pay up-front costs for ART.238 
Due to the tax deduction model’s inability to cover up-front 
costs combined with the high cost of ART, for some people, 
whether medically or structurally infertile, issues of access 
would not be resolved. For lesbians and single women, the 
model may be ideal because the procedures sought, such as 
artificial insemination, are inexpensive, but this method is not 
helpful if multiple attempts are needed.239 Also, for the medico-
structurally infertile or for single or gay men who need more 
expensive interventions, having to front-load several tens of 
thousands of dollars likely means that access will not be 
possible.240 According to one commentator, “This perhaps 
explains the heavy emphasis on insurance in debates about 
assisted-reproduction finance.”241 While further research into 
this area is important, it will be crucial to determine if there is 
a manner to manage front-loaded costs of ART within this 
system. 
B. INSURANCE MANDATES 
As insurance mandates currently stand, they result in 
inequitable distribution of resources by prioritizing all fertility 
treatments to heterosexual married couples and excluding 
access primarily for gay and unmarried persons with or 
without medical causes of their infertility. While the current 
structure of state mandates poses some legal issues and health 
justice problems, the idea of state-mandated insurance for ART 
is not in and of itself inherently inequitable. Insurance 
mandates could result in more equitable distribution of 
resources, but a number of considerations must be addressed. 
 237. Ringo, supra note 16, at 887. 
 238. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152. 
 239. DeLair, supra note 33, at 160–61. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152. 
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Both internal and external exclusionary factors, as discussed in 
previous sections, need to be explored in greater detail to 
determine their impact on different groups. 
With respect to some of the external factors discussed 
previously, a mandate to offer rather than a mandate to cover, 
as seen in California and Texas, could lead to greater equity.242 
It would give everyone, regardless of marital status or sexual 
orientation, the ability to bargain for ART if it is important to 
them and, if desired, to pay the resulting insurance premiums 
for such treatments. It would also likely reduce costs of ART 
overall given the presumably higher use of ART throughout the 
country, which could potentially increase access for individuals 
who either lack insurance or live in states without mandated 
insurance. However, because insurance companies would only 
be required to offer but not to provide coverage, there is a 
possibility that a smaller pool of persons will be willing to buy 
infertility coverage.243 This will make premiums higher244 and 
possibly too expensive for many to afford. 
Other external factors utilized in state-mandated 
insurance coverage could also expand access to gay and 
unmarried persons and resolve healthcare justice issues. Caps 
on the amount of money available for ART or on the number of 
procedures are limits which could give everyone an opportunity 
to procreate via ART without limiting access for gay and 
unmarried persons.245 Of course, this type of limit would 
restrict coverage of ART overall; thus, some individuals who 
would require multiple rounds of IVF (for example, due to older 
maternal age or severe fertility disorder) may not be able to 
achieve a live birth before they have run out of their allotted 
funds. However, this approach provides a larger number of 
people with at least some opportunity to attempt to procreate, 
and there are no guarantees that ART will achieve pregnancy 
 242. California: “every health care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for 
the treatment of infertility, except in vitro fertilization,” CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); Texas: “an issuer of a group health 
benefit plan that provides pregnancy-related benefits . . . shall offer and make 
available . . . coverage for . . . expenses incurred . . . from in vitro fertilization 
procedures.” TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1366.003 (West 2009). See generally 
NCSL, supra note 67 (listing the insurance coverage laws for infertility 
applicable to each state). 
 243. In-Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2100. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See statutes cited supra note 71. 
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for everyone anyway. Furthermore, limits like the ones in New 
Jersey and Illinois, which require that an individual go through 
the most inexpensive treatments first, could help to broaden 
access without harming the structurally infertile.246 
Additionally, as the section on legal analysis suggests, 
there are some internal factors within the statutes that are 
more desirable than others with respect to the needs of the 
structurally infertile and medico-structurally infertile. For 
example, requirements of a stated period of infertility or even 
unprotected intercourse for a period of time are not problematic 
if they are adapted to include the structurally and medico-
structurally infertile. So long as gay and unmarried persons 
can prove structural infertility without having to engage in 
unprotected sex, there is no public health concern nor are there 
the wasted resources of attempting to prove medical infertility 
for someone who does not have medically-related complications. 
Spousal language is not advisable due to its exclusion of 
most groups of structurally and medico-structurally infertile 
regardless of medical cause and its potential resulting legal 
issues. Issues of medical causality or medical necessity are 
interesting and more complex. While they, without a doubt, do 
not exclude medico-structurally infertile, the issue is much less 
clear for structurally infertile persons. While there is an 
argument to be made on either side as to whether structural 
infertility is a health issue (which greatly depends as 
previously discussed on how broadly one defines health), it is 
not clear that the medical cause is what we are concerned 
about. As discussed earlier, the real toll to society from 
infertility seems to be the infringement of the rights of 
individuals to become parents, which is viewed as a life 
achievement, and this argument holds true regardless of 
whether one is speaking of heterosexual married couples or 
not.247 
Additionally, it is unclear whether it is desirable to attach 
a medical diagnosis and the related social and other 
implications to structural infertility. Some have encouraged a 
medicalized model of infertility covered by insurance. Such a 
model can reduce other inequities, such as financially helping 
those infertile individuals who go into debt in trying to finance 
their pregnancies. It could also create standards for “what 
 246. See statutes cited supra note 72. 
 247. Monahan, supra note 199, at 176. 
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kinds of fertility treatments make sense”248 and which do not249 
while also eliminating use of ART by heterosexual couples that 
do not need the technology to reproduce. However, in some 
ways, medicalizing may attach a medical diagnosis stigma to 
sexual orientation or marital status. Further research and 
discussion is needed in this area. At the outset, it seems more 
logical to expand these types of statutes to call for infertility, 
whether medical or structural, because it is an important social 
desire rather than just linked to medical conditions and not the 
other way around. Such a definition would also eliminate those 
instances where medical cause cannot be found. Furthermore, 
these concerns can be addressed in statutory language that 
does not, in a broad stroke, exclude whole groups of people that 
depend on these technologies. 
Given both options, the better practice appears to be a 
state-mandated insurance schematic that uses external factors 
rather than internal factors to limit coverage and that does not 
make resource allocation decisions based on sexual orientation 
or marital status alone. Legislatures are encouraged to 
consider what types of external factors, such as treatment 
amount and dollar limits, could provide the most just and 
practical limits on care while ensuring broad access and 
successful outcomes. Mandates to offer rather than cover may 
be good options, along with caps on total amount per person or 
limits on the number of ART cycles per patient. Additionally, if 
internal factors are used, careful consideration should be given 
to whether medical definitions are necessary and, if so, to what 
purpose. Furthermore, spousal language is discouraged, and, 
where structural infertility can be shown, requirements of 
unprotected intercourse are also problematic. Additionally, 
legislatures must consider the broader context in which state-
mandated insurance coverage for ART is placed. Widened 
access for gay and unmarried persons is not beneficial if issues 
of parental custody and domestic partner benefits are not 
resolved in this context. Furthermore, as outlined in this paper, 
legislatures must keep in mind the legal limitations raised by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims in particular. 
It is also important to note that this discussion of possible 
mechanisms of distribution is not intended to be exhaustive. 
 248. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 68. 
 249. See id. 
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Certainly, other models of access could be proposed such as a 
hybrid-model or a social-welfare model, which treats ART more 
like a social issue (like food, housing, or shelter). Further 
research and policy development in this area is important, as is 
more empirical work into the implications—financial, social, 
and otherwise—of state-mandated insurance coverage of ART 
in the context of married heterosexual persons as well as the 
structurally and medico-structurally infertile. 
As the title insinuates, regulation of ART and deciding who 
receives it is truly an art and not a science. Balancing the 
interest of the broad host of individuals who desire ART and 
prioritizing needs at the same time will require much 
innovation. The issue of ART and who receives ART touches 
upon some of the most significant legal, ethical, moral, and 
political questions of our time. ART holds the potential for a 
wide variety of people to create families, who previously could 
not, and this group includes those who are unmarried or gay. 
ART, state-mandated insurance coverage of ART, and access 
and coverage of insurance for gay and unmarried persons, 
challenge the boundaries of law, medicine, and ethics. These 
issues also touch on a foundational question of the state’s role 
when deciding whether to ensure or prevent the reproductive 
potential of individuals and groups. Such dialogue cannot be 
entered into lightly, and, as the debate around distribution and 
prioritization of ART continues, it will be important to critically 
analyze both the potential and limitations of state-mandated 
insurance coverage for ART in current and future forms and 
the goals which it seeks to address. 
 
